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3INTRODUCTION
The EU has not been perceived as reacting very rapidly or effectively to the so-
called Arab Spring. Events do validate the underpinning idea of the European
Security Strategy and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): only where
governments guarantee to their citizens security, prosperity, freedom and equal-
ity, can peace and stability last – otherwise, people will revolt. But in practice,
in its southern neighbourhood the EU has acted in precisely the opposite man-
ner, so the Arab Spring is occurring in spite of rather than thanks to EU policy.
The ENP stands at a crossroads therefore: Can a new start be made? Which
instruments and, in times of austerity, which means can the EU apply to consol-
idate democratization? And, finally, can the EU continue to wage an ENP with-
out addressing the hard security dimension, especially as the US seem to be with-
drawing from crisis management in the region – or shall it continue to leave that
to others?
In this joint publication, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Egmont
and the European Policy Centre (EPC), address some of the key dimensions of
the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean region.
Sven Biscop, Egmont
Rosa Balfour, EPC
Michael Emerson, CEPS

5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Arab Spring is a revolutionary event on the EU’s doorstep, of importance
comparable to the end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe some two
decades ago. First it has ended the Arab exception to the proposition of democ-
racy and human rights as universal values. Second it has demonstrated to all
remaining authoritarian and/or grossly corrupted regimes around the world the
power of the new technologies of social networking in undermining such
regimes. Third it renews the challenge for both political scientists and practition-
ers to work out feasible political reform strategies for bridging the transition
between authoritarianism and sound democratic governance.
Historical perspectives on revolution. The Arab Spring now qualifies as one of
the quite few episodes in world history when a revolutionary movement has
spilled over state borders and by contagion become a revolution of a number of
states sharing some historical-cultural-geographic identity; other episodes are so
well know that it suffices to mention their dates, 1789, 1848, 1917, 1989. The
question that Michael EMERSON explores is what kind of political dynamics may
be expected to follow in the wake of revolution. Historians analyzing ‘great
revolutions’ have identified a syndrome according to which after the overthrow
of the old regime moderate factions try to establish a democratic system, but fail
to retain control, and see the initiative pass to violently radical forces, leading
to a new ideological authoritarianism which can last for decades (as in the after-
math of the French, Russian, Chinese and Iranian revolutions). But there are
numerous other possible scenarios in historical experience. Which are the direc-
tions most likely for the Arab Spring? To begin to address this question the
author groups the 17 Arab states, from Morocco to Yemen, into a matrix with
four groups, the petro-states versus non-petro-states, and the monarchies versus
the non-monarchies. The argument is that the petro-monarchies, being both rich
and enjoying traditional tribal or religious loyalties, can for the time being buy
off protests. But the non-petro states have to satisfy political demands with
political measures, which can lead the non-petro-monarchies, such as Morocco
and Jordan, down the well-trodden path of progressive constitutionalisation of
their regimes. However the non-petro republics have the toughest tasks of man-
aging revolutionary situations. While peaceful revolutions such as in Tunisia
have the best chances of success, the case of Egypt is already much more com-
plicated, and the prospects for the civil war cases (Libya, Syria, Yemen) include
ominous scenarios such as descent into the category of the failing state (as Iraq)
or failed state (as Somalia). The general lesson of history is that revolutions have
an amazing variety of outcomes.
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EU-Mediterranean relations after the Arab Spring. Rosa BALFOUR notes that
the EU’s response to the Arab Spring has first of all been marked by recognition
that basic paradigms of its prior policy have been overturned, namely that
regime stability would deliver greater security for both the region and the EU,
and that economic reform would lead to more political pluralism. In addition,
while not so much the subject of explicit comment by the EU, the Arab Spring
has exposed as a myth the idea of ‘Arab exceptionalism’, based on culturalist
interpretations of Islam being incompatible with democracy. In its official policy
documents since the Arab Spring got under way the EU acknowledged that its
prior status quo policies were mistaken. This led on into a reshaping of EU
policy doctrine towards the region with several elements: stronger political con-
ditionality and differentiation between states of the region under the slogan
‘more for more’, new tools for democracy promotion (a Civil Society Facility,
and a European Endowment for democracy), and emphasis on the three Ms –
more Money, more Market access, and more Mobility. A newly minted pro-
gramme for organizing additional financial resources was named (with our con-
gratulations to the official responsible) ‘SPRING’, standing for Support for Part-
nership, Reform and Inclusive Growth. Still the author warns that these revi-
sions of policy will have to be evaluated in the light of their actual
implementation. In particular the increased emphasis on conditionality on paper
shows no signs of deeper analysis of whether the EU enjoys the leverage, attrac-
tion, incentives and relevance to be able to exercise it. For example how will this
work in the pivotal case of Egypt where there emerges a highly complex political
dynamic, including major electoral successes by both moderate and radical
Islamist parties. Dilemma situations, as already experienced with the electoral
success of Hamas, will doubtless surface again. Further, there is no clarity yet
over whether or how far the EU’s member states will support concrete measures
to open up under any of the three Ms – Money, Markets and Mobility. This
leads the author to entitle her concluding section ‘Plus ça change?’
A Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area. There is a significant risk that the high
hopes of the populations of the South Mediterranean states will turn sour if a
fresh long-term vision for economic development is not put in place. While pri-
mary responsibility for achieving this has to be with the South Mediterranean
states themselves, Andre SAPIR and Georg ZACHMAN argue in favour of a bold
initiative by the EU to frame economic reform strategies, notably by setting the
objective of constituting by 2030 a vast Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area
(EMEA), which would draw inspiration from the existing European Economic
Area (EEA) that links the EU to Norway, Iceland and Liechstenstein. Of course
the South Mediterranean economies lag way behind the EEA, but the twenty
year objective provides a plausible time horizon for achieving fundamental
results. The EU should offer complete openness for goods, services and capital,
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with front-loaded concessions in the agricultural sector, thus revising and deep-
ening current free trade agreements. In exchange the South Mediterranean states
would be gradually implementing EU economic legislation, social and environ-
mental policies. For the labour market the EU should organize a ‘Blue Card’
system for granting temporary work permits to highly-skilled workers, and
more generally put in place mechanisms to favour circular migration, facilitating
the upgrade of human capital. The EU already offers the prospect of deepening
the existing free trade agreements on a bilateral basis, but the offers are not
comprehensive either sectorally or as a regional multilateral whole. The starting
points of the South Mediterranean states are of course widely different, but the
authors suggest that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt can open up the tan-
talizing prospect of a new social, political and economic era for the entire Med-
iterranean region. The creation of the EMEA would entail long-term benefits for
the EU itself, with increased economic growth through increased specialization,
increased supply of human capital and greater energy security.
A resource secure neighbourhood. The South Mediterranean region has consid-
erable endowments in natural gas, oil, iron ore, phosphates, steel, wood
extracts, zinc and fisheries, as well as for Mediterranean agriculture products.
Daniel FIOTT would like to see this potential translated into something he would
call ‘resource-full revolutions’. Specific initiatives would include a Euro-Med
Energy Community, bearing in mind the experience of the EU in extending its
energy policies into south-east Europe, which places an important emphasis on
harmonization of the regulatory environment. He refers also to the Mediterra-
nean Solar Plan of the Union for the Mediterranean, and the intentions of the
EU to conclude new trade liberalization agreements for fisheries and agriculture.
At the G20 level there were attempts this year to advance commodity policies,
such as with the new Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which
FAO is entrusted to develop, but these remain to prove their value.
The role of the military in the Arab Spring is the subject of a comparative study
by Rouba AL-FATTAL EECKELAERT of six cases (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya,
Bahrain and Syria), of which the military forces of Egypt, Yemen and Syria are
by far the most important. Their roles in the Arab Spring so far can be summa-
rized as falling into three pairs of quite different categories: (i) those where the
military remained loyal to the leadership and were responsible for brutal repres-
sion of the uprisings (Bahrain and Syria); (ii) those where the army sided with
the protestors and were instrumental in ousting the leadership (Tunisia and
Egypt); and (iii) those where the military was split and suffered crucial defection
to the side of protestors (Libya and Yemen). This leads to the crucial question
what factors can explain these divergent course of action taken by the three
groups of militaries. The thesis proposed is that the military will remain loyal to
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the leadership in the presence of uprisings when two conditions are present, first
that the state suffers deep sectarian or ethnic cleavages, and second where the
leadership comes from a minority group, which then packs the military with
senior officers from this same group. When the uprising gets serious, and repres-
sion has become vicious, the military find their own fates locked in with the
leadership. These conditions are seen now in Syria where Assad and his military
chiefs come from the minority Alawite community (although there have been
some defections), and in Bahrain where the King and his senior colleagues are
from the Sunni minority. By contrast Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are all cases
where the overwhelming majority of the population, the leadership and military
are all Sunni. Yemen is a more complex case, with less clear cut sectarian divides.
Lessons from Libya. The military intervention in Libya, led by France and the
UK, and commanded by NATO, became the most significant application so far
of the relatively new normative doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This
operation thus ranks as an important case study at the frontier of contemporary
international relations. Sven BISCOP takes a hard look at what this has meant for
the European Union in particular. While European countries were in the lead the
EU itself was absent, both in leaving command of the operation to NATO and
not even managing to have a common position in the UN Security Council, with
Germany having famously or infamously chosen to abstain in company with
China and Russia. All this is a very sad story for the EU’s attempts to develop
its security and defence policy. Biscop argues that this could have been an
impressive operation under the political aegis of the EU, even when using NATO
for command and control and for inclusion of vital US capabilities such as for
in-flight refuelling and satellite intelligence. Given the UN Security Council
mandate, the support of the Arab League, the proximity to Europe, and the
willingness of the US to leave leadership to Europe, Biscop asks “how many
more boxes needed to be ticked before the EU could step into the breach and
take charge of crisis management?”
Prospects for the Middle East peace process? How does the Arab Spring now
affect the prospects for the finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
This is the question addressed by Muriel ASSEBURG. Unfortunately the author
concludes that the prospects are anything but good, and on the contrary
observes a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing negative repercussions, which
make conflict resolution increasingly unlikely. The failure in the course of 2011
of the Palestinian pursuit of statehood at the UN to translate into a constructive
step towards Palestinian self-determination risks instead heightened tensions
and a third intifada. The author severely criticizes the EU for the inconsistency
of its approach in supporting the two state solution while allying with the US
and Israel to derail the Palestinian quest for statehood. While plausible contours
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of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement are well known (Clinton parameters of 2000,
the Taba Summit of January 2001, the unofficial Geneva Accord of 2003), the
prospects of their realization are fast evaporating with the continuing settlement
expansion and increasing fragmentation of the West Bank. In desperation Pales-
tinians increasingly discuss the one-state option, in which the Palestinian
Authority would be dissolved, all responsibilities would be handed to the occu-
pying power, and Palestinians would switch their priorities to achieving equal
citizenship rights in the single state. While this scenario has a clear logic, it is
unlikely to succeed, since Israel would not wish to annex these territories. Unless
the EU could in the near future lead the Middle East Quartet into mediating a
fresh push for conflict resolution, the author fears that violent escalation will be
looming, and with it the demise of the two-state solution.
Our overall messages are three fold. First, we have noted that revolutions pro-
duce amazingly varied outcomes, and a whole range of possibilities have to be
kept in mind, spanning the range between conventional democracy, Islamic
democracy, dysfunctional democracy, military regimes, restored authoritarian-
ism, and unfortunately even the possible descent into the miserable world of the
failed state. Second, the EU’s response has on paper recognized the scale of the
changes in the Arab world, and adapted its declared policy doctrines, yet it is far
from clear whether there will be significant mobilization of the three Ms –
money, markets and mobility. Third, there are two instances where the EU glar-
ingly missed opportunities for significant action, both the Libya campaign, and
the Palestinian push for statehood recognition at the UN. In both cases the fault
lies essentially with the member states which have been unwilling to discipline
themselves for collective action, and have thus squandered the potential of the
EU as a global or even here a regional actor. In the case of Libya Germany had
the lead role in demobilizing the EU. In the Palestinian case the member states
allowed themselves, notably in the vote over UNESCO membership, the futile
luxury of splitting three ways between those for, those against, and those
abstaining, as if they all had objectively different vital interests at stake which is
patently not the case; and then they criticize the High Representative and the
European External Action Service. Overall the EU retains the potential to
respond strategically to the Arab Spring, but is not yet getting much beyond
declarations.
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THE ARAB REVOLUTION OF 2011: PROSPECTS VIEWED 
THROUGH THE LENS OF HISTORY
MICHAEL EMERSON1
The Arab Revolution of 2011 takes its place in the quite small number of revo-
lutionary episodes in world history that have had major regional or continental
dimensions, and involved revolution by contagion between a number of states
sharing some historical-cultural-geographic identity: 1789, 1848, 1917, 1989 of
course, and the great decolonisation revolutions, first in Latin America between
1811 and 1821, and then in Africa and south-east Asia after World War II.
This paper has three parts, which are progressively more difficult. First a
number of political regime types are identified that exist in the world and have
some possible relevance for discussing the possible destinations of the Arab Rev-
olution. Second a number of dynamic models of political change are noted from
political history, especially those seen in the wake of revolutionary regime over-
throw. Finally we take our chances in assessing which of these models seem most
plausible for different groups of 17 Arab states, from Morocco to Yemen, cate-
gorised first of all between the petro-states versus non-petro-states, and the
monarchies versus the non-monarchies or republics.
States of Political Nature
This can be short – just enough to remind ourselves that there are several well-
known political regime species to choose from in speculating about the possible
destinations of the Arab Revolution. This is all the more necessary if one heeds
the observation of one scholar who has studied revolutions across the centuries,
‘revolutions have such amazingly varied outcomes’.2
One reference, but hardly the only one, is the mature liberal democracy of West-
ern Europe and the West. But this sometimes has its problems, as Churchill
remarked: ‘democracy is the worst of all possible systems, except for the alter-
natives’, of which there are many.
There are a number of hybrid categories. There is the dysfunctional democracy,
for which Ukraine after the Orange Revolution of 2005 provided an example,
1. Thanks to Lore van den Putte for research assistance.
2. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (London: Blackwell, 1993) p. 16.
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which was democratic but suffered chronic institutional confusion to the point
of making effective governance impossible. There is the deeply corrupted
democracy, or kleptocracy, with many cases in Eastern and South Eastern
Europe of ‘state capture’. This morphs into the semi-authoritarian state, of
which Russia is a current example. This may also be deeply corrupt, but distin-
guishes itself from the dysfunctional democracy by virtue of its ‘strong state’
capacity which can override democratic checks and balances.
A rather different hybrid type is the enlightenment model, which harks back to
the idea promoted by European philosphers of the 18th century such as Voltaire.
He advocated respect for civil liberties and a rule of law, but without democratic
institutions, hence the ‘enlightened despot’ brand which attracts various Arab
petro-monarchies. Another hybrid type, of special relevance to the Arab Spring,
is the democracy with religious inspiration, now topical with the ‘moderate
Islamist democratic party’ model projected by the AK leadership of Turkey.
They in turn makes comparisons with the Christian Democrat parties in much
of Europe, which actually have morphed into secular parties, and whether this
will happen to the moderate Islamist parties is an issue.
Next we have several species of authoritarianism. There are military regimes of
several graduations, from the outright junta of generals as in Burma (about to
loosen up at last?) and earlier in much of Latin America. More subtle is the
military as reserve power, able to intervene with coup d’etat as and when they
feel the civlian leadership is failing in their duties (Turkey in the last decades of
the 20th century). Then there are the ideological or theocratic dictatorships, of
which the world has seen several sub-species, be they fascists (Germany, Spain),
or communists (Russia, China), or Islamic theocrats (Iran). Also there are other
less ideological but personal civilian dictators, although these have often been
often former military officers, who establish a power structure that may discon-
nect in some degree from the military (Bouteflika, Sukarno, Suharto, Khadaffi,
Mubarak).
Finally there is the failed state, where there is a generalisation of violence, crim-
inality, insecurity, and absence of public services and governance. This has been
surfacing in recent times, for example in D.R. Congo and, closest to home for
the Arab world, in Somalia. Some would say ‘re-surfacing again’, since much of
the pre-modern world was like that.
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Models of Regime Change Dynamics
A shortlist of eight dynamic models is identified for what may follow a popular
uprising that overthrows the incumbant regime.3
The ‘great revolution’ model. Scholars of the world’s ‘great revolutions’, and of
the political dynamics that follow in their wake, have sobering messages. The
seminal work of Crane Brinton, published in 1938,4 identified one recurrent
model or syndrome with a sequence of stages:
• First there are rising mass protests against an unjust regime;
• the governing power uses force to try and suppress the uprising,
• but this fails and the demands of the masses become more radical,
• and the regime is then overthrown,
• followed by a short honeymoon period, when moderate factions trying to get
reform,
• but they have insufficient unity and strength to control the situation,
• and so then a militant group with radical ideology takes over,
• leading into a reign of terror,
• which exhausts itself after a while,
• but yielding to some new authoritarianism which lasts for years or decades.
Brinton worked out this model sequence after comparative review of several
‘great revolutions’, with the French and Russian revolutions most plausibly fit-
ting into this mould, with his nalysis also drawing on the English and American
revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries respectively. One could add the Chi-
nese revolution, starting in 1911 but maturing only after an interval of war into
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976. Most recently the
Iranian Islamic revolution of 1978 also broadly fits the model. Scholars of rev-
olutions (such as Goldstone, op.cit.) contest the general validity of this model,
and indeed world history has demonstrated a plethora of models, of which we
offer some now below. However the track record of the ‘great revolution’ model
is sufficiently impressive with the French, Russian, Chinese and Iranian revolu-
tions that it can hardly be dismissed.
Instant democracy. This is the polar opposite of the great revolution model. In
the best of cases there would still have to be time after the regime is overthrown
to prepare constituent assemblies, adopt new democratic constitutions, and for
political parties to get organised for the first post-revolutionary elections. His-
3. For a comprehensive summary of attempts to theorize revolution, see Jack Goldstone, ‘Towards a
Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 4, 2001.
4. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Norton, 1938).
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tory does not offer many examples of instant and sustained transition. The
major case has been that of Central Europe following the collapse of commu-
nism in 1989-1991. But here there were exceptional explanatory factors: earlier
experiences of democratic practice, emphatic European identities, exit from the
Soviet occupation, and application for EU membership with its powerful incen-
tives and conditionalities. For the Arab world these factors are clearly not
present. One may wonder whether the case of India is more relevant, since it has
sustained democratic practice since independence in 1947. Yet here there was
the extraordinary leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, who somehow synthesised
the peaceful philosophies of Hinduism and Buddhism with the culture of the
rule of law from the English bar; in addition Indian political leaders and the
British imperial power had been preparing the political structure of the inde-
pendent Indian state already from early in the 20th century. And Gandhi’s
extraordinary powers of inspiration by example survived his assassination in
1948.
Instant democracy imposed through war by external power. This model has
had two spectacular successes (Germany, Japan) and two spectacular failures
(Iraq, Afghanistan) within living memory. But the relevance of the first two cases
for the Arab Spring is remote, since the democratic regimes were imposed on
advanced societies with prior history of democratic institutions. The second pair
are the ongoing stories of Iraq and Afghanistan. While a modicum of democratic
process has been established in both cases, the costs in terms of ensuing sectarian
conflict and human lives has been huge. Whether Libya can do better becomes
the next test case.
Gradual democratic constitutionalisation of the monarchy. This model has
been observed in half a dozen European states, but in several cases the evolu-
tionary process took many centuries (starting from 1215 in the case of England’s
Magna Carta, and many centuries ago for Sweden and Poland), with several
others developing only in the 19th and 20th centuries. The kingdoms of Morocco
and Jordan identify with a model of evolutionary constutionalisation, and we
discuss these cases and the Gulf petro-monarchies further below.
Zig-zag model. Following on from the French Revolution of 1789, the 1848
revolutions in Europe are notably relevant for the Arab Spring because of the
contagion factor: France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Poland,
Romania and Switzerland were all drawn into what became known as the
‘Spring of Nations’, or ‘Springtime of the Peoples’. The resonance with the Arab
Spring goes deeper than these words. There was no coordination or cooperation
among the revolutionaries of different countries in Europe in 1848, but there
were common themes in their motivations: discontent with political leaderships,
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demands for more participation and democracy, demands for better conditions
of the working classes and the upsurge of nationalism. But within a year of 1848
reactionary forces had won out and the revolutions themselves collapsed. The
reactionary forces were based in the royalty, the aristocracy, the army and the
peasants. The uprisings were led by shaky ad-hoc coalitions of reformers, the
middle classes and workers, but these could not hold together for long. In the
course of the 1848 revolution tens of thousands of people were killed and many
more forced into exile. It took another half-century of political zig-zags in
France in particular before democratic norms became solidly entrenched, after
a bewildering of zig-zag of political regimes changes, from democratic republi-
canism to empire to republican dictatorship and back to monarchy, before the
emergence of relatively normal democratic governance.
Banana republic model. This is a dynamic version of the military regime. When
the civilian governance becomes too chaotic, or corrupt, or catastrophic for the
economy, the army moves in to throw out the bad leadership, and then maybe
establishes a junta for direct military rule for a while, or alternatively installs
their preferred civilian leader. In Latin America, the so-called ‘banana republic’
brand predominated from the time of independence at the beginning of the 19th
century for almost two centuries, with military coups typically intervening to
throw out oligarchal land-owning dictators, or with alternation between mili-
tary and civilian authoritarian regimes. Only in the last decade or two did rec-
ognisable democracy become the predominant regime type in Latin America,
notably in Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Thailand holds the world record for the
frequency of military coups, numbering over 30 since the military reduced the
powers of the monarchy in 1932.
Relapse back to authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism. After short and
unsuccessful periods of attempted democracy, the relapse has been seen recently
in both Russia and Ukraine, after the relative failure of the Yeltsin period in the
1990s and Yushchenko-Timoshenko period in the 2000s respectively. If Putin
now resumes the Russian presidency for two more terms it could take the clock
forward to 2024, and with his reign having begun in 2000 this would make a
24-year period for his domination of the Russian political scene. In some earlier
experiences in South-East Asia, post-revolutionary (post-independence after
World War II) attempts at installing democracy fell prey to very long dictator-
ships. In Indonesia President Sukarno began as leader of a liberal parliamentary
regime but gradually over 20 years turned his reign into a personality cult dic-
tatorship, which was overthrown by coup d’état led by General Suharto, who in
turn became President for another 30 years. Independence in the Philippines in
1946 saw the introduction of constitutional democracy, but in 1965 the cor-
rectly elected Ferdinand Marcos turned his record into that of a notoriously
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corrupt and constitutionally illegitimate 20 year presidency. Both the Indonesian
and Philippine cases thus saw around half a century of authoritarianism before
recognisable democracy emerged in the last decade. However in Russia now the
scent of the Arab Spring seems to be spreading, with mushrooming street pro-
tests following the rigged December 2011 parliamentary election; the prospect
of a 24 year reign for Putin seems to have suddenly evaporated.
The dynamics of the failed state model are characterised by enduring conflict
and civil war, ethnic or religious divides, generalised insecurity, and collapse of
basic public services and infrastructures.5 The most relevant and nearby exam-
ple is Somalia. Analysts of the failed state point to a tipping point syndrome,
where the generalisation of insecurity and fear pushes society into armed militias
and criminal gangs, be they tribal, ethnic, or sectarian, which descend into a
vicious circle of violent and destructive conflict with no resolution. Civil war is
usually at the start of the process, with violent plunder and lawlessness then
becoming the only way for competing groups to struggle for survival.
And What Next for the Arab Spring?
First there are some criteria for making some preliminary groupings among the
seventeen Arab states from Morocco to Yemen, namely the petro states versus
the non-petro states, and the monarchies versus the non-monarchies (republics).
This introduces some pervasive, although hardly exclusive determinants of
political responses to the Arab Spring. The petro-states have monetary means to
satisfy basic social needs the easy way, to the point of drugging the people with
manna. The petro-monarchies can combine this with their spiritual and/or tribal
legitimacy. The regimes of non-petro states that are also non-monarchies are the
most exposed to societal pressures, whereas the non-petro-monarchies can try
to use their authority to head off popular pressures with just a gradual process
of consitutionalisation of their rule. But this first sorting into four primary cat-
egories will need finer qualifications in order to attach each of the Arab states
to one or other of the eight dynamic models identified in the preceding section.
5. R. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail – Causes and Consequences (Princeton University Press, 2004).
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Further explanatory variables are needed for explaining reactions to the Arab
Spring, and for the chances of democratic practice emerging in particular. Three
such criteria are:
(a) the peacefulness or violence of uprisings of the people,
(b) the presence or absence of deep societal cleavages, be they sectarian between
Sunni and Shia muslims, or between the secular versus the religious, or
between ethnic and territorial divides, and
(c) the cultural, economic and institutional preparedness for moving towards
functioning democracy.
Positive readings on all three accounts maximise the chances of democracy tak-
ing root, whereas negative readings enhance the chances of regime instability,
leading on to one or other of the several other non-democratic scenarios set out
above, be it return to authoritarianism, or in the worst cases civil war and state
failure.
Petro monarchies. The petro-monarchies have all in the course of 2011 been
responding to the Arab Spring by trying to keep the people happy more with
money rather than political freedoms. They have been doing this on a grand
scale in the six petro-monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which
together occupy all top six positions in the value of petro-revenues per capita
(Annex Table 1). Public sector salaries, welfare benefits and subsidies for basic
necessities such as food have been ramped up, by margins of one-third to 100%.
The extreme petro-wealth has also over the last few decades seen the Gulf states
build up massive dependence on imported foreign labour mainly from Asia,
such that in some cases they occupy more than half of the work force, with even
higher percentages of private sector employment. The corollary of this is that the
employment of nationals of the Gulf states is mostly in the public sector (80%
in Saudi Arabia), which further dampens latent demands for liberalising meas-
Petro-states Non-petro-states
Monarchies Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Jordan
Morocco
Non-monarchies (republics) Libya
Algeria
Iraq
Egypt
Tunisia
Lebanon
Palestinian Territories
Syria
Yemen
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ures, since the immigrant working classes have no citizenship rights and no say
in any political questions.
It seems that this strategy of increasing the dosage of public manna to the citi-
zens is broadly working for the time being. Token acts of political liberalisation
have also been made, such as voting rights for women in Saudi Arabia for
municipal elections. If the strategy seems to be working for the time being, it is
by the same token storing up trouble for the future by creating conditions of
economic unsustainability. The increases in public sector salaries and welfare
benefits further reduces the chances of the economy developing competitive
employment in the private sector. This problem may be especially acute in Saudi
Arabia by comparison with the smaller Gulf states, which are trying seriously to
develop tourist, financial and transport service sectors, but even there much of
this employment is taken by foreign nationals. Maybe these states have a further
10, 20 or 30 years to live well off petro revenues, but when the time for detox
comes it may be very painful, with unpredictable political consequences.
The six top petro-states are also monarchies, benefitting from legitimacy that
comes from either traditional tribal authority, or spiritual status, or both. The
King of Saudi Arabia is customarily referred to as ‘The Custodian of the Two
Holy Mosques King Abdullah’. The extended family of the monarch is said to
run to around 7,000 very wealthy persons, with 200 direct descendants of
former King Ibn Saud.
These sources of legitimacy are dampening factors with respect to latent
demands for political democratisation. The leaderships of the petro-republics,
do not have these advantages, and two of them have already been killed
(Saddam Hussein and Khadaffi), while the Algerian leadership has only sus-
tained its position after a long and terrible cvil war. Still the monarchs should
not forget the fate of Charles I and Louis XVI.
Bahrain and Oman are the two relatively least wealthy petro-monarchies, and
both have seen serious unrest. In Bahrain the sectarian divide between the
minority Sunni leadership and majority Shia populace, combined with manifest
privileges for the minority in employment, led to the Pearl Roundabout uprising
which was suppressed only with the aid of the Saudi military in March 2011.
However the royal family was split between a conservative king and more
reformist crown prince, which at least led King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to
appoint on 29 June 2011 an independent commission of enquiry into the blood-
shed at the Pearl Roundabout. This impressive report, delivered in November
2011 could lead into a path of political reform towards constitutionalisation of
the monarchy. Bahrain’s supreme judicial council is now set upon reviewing
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judgements against protestors handed down earlier by the military courts. In
Oman uprisings on a lesser scale led the Sultan in March 2011 to decree that the
consultative Council would be granted some legislative and regulatory powers,
with a new Council formed after elections in October, thus also seeking to move
slightly towards constitutionalisation of the monarchy.
In the richest per capita Gulf state, Qatar, there are no such constitutional devel-
opments. However there is an energetic King who promotes something along
the lines of the enlightenment model, with relatively open civil liberties, huge
investments in education and research (Qatar Foundation), and an openness to
the international media (hosting Al Jazeera, BBC World Debates etc). Qatar has
sustained an activist position in relation to the Arab Spring, even supporting the
NATO campaign operationally with some fighter jets, and presiding the Arab
League work over the sanctioning Syria.
There are two break points at which one may draw the line between the major
petro-states, lesser petro-states, and non-petro states for the purpose of the
present analysis (see Table 1). The top petro states have revenues per capita of
over $6,000, sufficient to make an important impact on living standards as long
as there is a modicum of redistribution or trickle down. This sees only Libya
joining company with the six petro-monarchies. The second but much lower
break point can be at $1,000 of petro revenues per capita, which brings in Alge-
ria and Iraq, with big petro resources but also large populations. After that the
others have relatively small petro-resources (Yemen, Syria, Egypt), or none of
any significance (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories).
Non-petro monarchies. In both Jordan and Morocco the kings enjoy consider-
able traditional allegiances, including spiritual standing (both claim descend-
ance from the Prophet). These two kingdoms have no easy way to meet the
aspirations of the people by distributing manna, and are therefore constrained
to answer pressures for increased political participation directly. But because of
their perceived political legitimacy they have a model to pursue, that of gradual
evolutionary constitutionalisation of their regimes, with the participation of
moderate Islamist parties. With already some degree of civil liberties, this is in
line with the enlightenment model, combined with traces of the Turkish model
for inclusion of democratic Islamic parties. Morocco has revised its constitution
in order to transfer some powers to the parliament, and notably the power of
the parliamentary majority to appoint the prime minister. This allowed the mod-
erate Islamist party PJD to follow up their success in the November 2011 par-
liamentary elections by appointing as prime minister their leader, Abdilah Ben-
kirane. In Jordan the king has initiated a new party law, some electoral reform
and dialogue with the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood family. These two
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states may still risk being too minimalist in their response to the Arab Spring,
but they have a margin of political manoeuvre that could allow them to move
faster if necessary.
Petro republics. Algeria’s military achieved its counter-revolutionary coup in
1991, suppressing the Islamists’ electoral victory, and sustained its position
through a long and brutal civil war. The repressive regime remains strongly
entrenched, even if President Bouteflika has pushed back the role of the military.
Might Algeria now follow any of the alternative models of its neighbours –
Morocco’s gradual constitutional reform, through to the varying revolutionary
regime change models of Tunisia, Egypt of Libya? For the time being the answer
seems to be no, mainly because the legacy of brutal civil war discourages upris-
ings.
Iraq experienced its externally imposed regime change in 2003 with the invasion
by the US and allies, and subsequent execution of Saddam Hussein. It has
become a case study in the discredited proposition of democracy-imposed-by-
war. While there has been a notable level of participation in elections, devastat-
ing inter-sectarian violence has continued, which combined with the virtual
autonomy of the Kurds, seems to amount to a stalemate between opposing par-
ties in a semi-failed state condition. There is manifest concern that the final
withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2011 may lead to intensification of the
continuing daily violence, and thence renewed political instability.
Libya is a much harder proposition still, with poor ratings on all three criteria
listed above, and some of its leading rebels reputed to have had Al Qaida con-
nections. With Khadaffi finished, there will no doubt be serious efforts at install-
ing a democratic regime with substantial international support. But this will be
a huge challenge, and the historical examples of post-revolutionary radicalisa-
tion or of relapse into authoritarianism should not be forgotten.
Non-petro republics. These states are among the most exposed to social and
political pressures, lacking both petro wealth and leadership legitimised by tra-
dition They come in three pairs: two are already the most democratic of Arab
states or entities (Lebanon, Palestinian Territories), two are endeavouring to
make democracies of their recent revolutionary uprisings (Tunisia, Egypt), while
two are still in states of unresolved conflict (Syria, Yemen).
Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories are already ranked in international sur-
veys as the most democratic of the 17 Arab states (Table 2). Yet these are still
flawed democracies because of their deep sectarian divides, with the radical
Islamist Hezbollah now dominating the confessionally organised Lebanese pol-
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itics, and with Hamas ruling Gaza in political competition with the Fatah-led
West Bank. Civil war is part of their recent experiences and their continuing
fears in both cases, so much so in the case of Lebanon that the resumption of
full-scale civil war is kept at bay. The physical separation of Gaza and the West
Bank may allow the Palestinians’ bitter political competition to go on unre-
solved. Yet the Arab Spring may help improve the quality of democratic govern-
ance in both cases. In the Palestinian territories both Fatah and Hamas may feel
the need to be more sensitive to the demands of the people. Lebanese democracy
may win back a little more normality as and when the Syrian regime falls.
Tunisia and Egypt have led the revolution so far. Yet their paths now diverge.
Tunisia registers the most positive readings under most of the criteria presented
above: a non-petro state, a relatively well developed and diversified economy
and middle class. It advances constitutionally, with free and fair correct elections
in October producing a constituent assembly, which however has just scrapped
the time limit for its own life. The main winner, the Ennahda moderate Islamist
party, openly refers to the Turkish AK party model as one it wishes to emulate.
The secular-Islamist divide is evident, yet seems to be managed with moderation
on both sides.
One might hope that Egypt could follow the same path, but there are greater
hazards in this case, with deeper societal cleavages and the real possibility that
the military may try to slide from its current transitional role into that of a
permanent regime controller. Egypt seems a candidate for either of the two
Turkish models, the democratic Islamic regime or the military or both together.
While the Muslim Brotherhood emerged from the November 2011 elections as
the largest party, the most remarkable electoral success was that of the Salafist
party winning 25% of the votes, which warns that radicalisationation of the
revolution is not inconceivable in a scenario of continuing deep economic dis-
tress. This is four-way political struggle, between moderate and radical Islam-
ists, the secular liberals and the military, with minimal trust between all. Even
the great revolution model is conceivable. The Tahrir Square revolutionaries
mobilised again at the end of 2011 to protest against the military, initially the
defender of the people, now its enemy.
Syria, still in a state of virtual civil war after almost a year, sees the gradual
transformation of the conflict into sectarian and ethnic conflict, but with the
military still largely supporting Assad. But Syria is also a unique case in being at
the crux of an ominous set of regional inter-state tensions, with Iran’s
entrenched position as supporter of the regime at risk, Saudi Arabia increasingly
openly opposing Iran, as well as the tense Syria-Lebanon relationship, and the
Israeli-Palestinian/Arab confrontation. This amounts to a huge potential for
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regional conflagration, in which only rational reflection on who if anyone could
gain from war seems to be, or should be the restraint. For Syria’s own regime all
options seem to be open: a military coup to replace Assad, open civil war,
descent into a semi-failing state like Iraq, and with the prospect of a democratic
revolutionary regime change only seeming to be a distant prospect. The Arab
League deployed an observer mission at the end of 2011, but this was immedi-
ately being criticised for ineffectiveness.
Yemen for its part is already in a near failed-state condition, with fighting con-
tinuing between rival tribal militias and military splinter groups even after the
agreement of President Saleh to stand down in February 2012. The depressing
lessons of history are that when societies have fallen into the failed state condi-
tion it is all so difficult to reverse, and the life expectancy of such non-regimes
can be very long, as the cases of Congo and Somalia show. Violent Islamic rad-
icalisation would be a conceivable alternative scenario for Yemen.
Overall, the Arab states with the most ominous assembly of pre-conditions for
possible state failure, sharing some combination of tribal/ethnic/sectarian divi-
sions, and of conflict which already have (or could) become civil wars, are Bah-
rain, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Whether these conflicts lead on to resolution
with a victor, or in some cases separatism, or stalemate, or state failure remains
the open question.
Conclusion
The Arab world is no longer the exception among all major world regions in
having no democracy at all. But the sober message for the Arab Spring is that
spontaneous revolutionary movements may have their moment of glory at the
barricades, yet are vulnerable either to reversal by reactionary forces including
the army and former leadership structures, or to violent radicalisation, or to
dysfunctional democracy of various types. The EU’s official call for ‘deep
democracy’ in its neighbourhood has only a remote chance.
While the 17 Arab states from Morocco to Yemen have all been affected by the
Arab Spring, or Revolution of 2011, the regime trajectories that they are now
following, or likely to see, are hugely divergent. These are not random differ-
ences, but are susceptible to some systematic groupings, first between the petro
states versus the non-petro states, and the largely overlapping categories of the
monarchies versus the non-monarchies.
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With the exception of Libya, the top petro-states (and all except Libya are petro-
monarchies) have avoided revolution so far. They seem set to continue along
paths that range between the status quo with tactical measures of slight liberal-
isation and expanded welfare measures in the petro states. For their part, the
non-petro monarchies attempt very gradual movements towards their demo-
cratic constitutionalisation. All these monarchical regimes seem to aim at some
kind of Arab version of the old European enlightened despot, which can carry
on for a long time, but the petro-monarchies are storing up trouble for later on
by buying off popular discontent with manna.
Of the non-monarchies, seven have seen or are in the course of experiencing
revolutionary regime change, including one counter-revolution some time ago
(Algeria 20 years back). The score so far by the end of 2011 is three outright
regime changes (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), with two more in the offing (Syria,
Yemen). The range of scenarios here for their post-revolutionary dynamics
encompasses the widest spectrum of possibilities, with Tunisia appearing to be
best positioned to become seriously democratic, while Yemen may be heading
towards the failed state. In between, one can speculate whether Egypt might
gravitate towards either of the two Turkish models on display (the old military
model, or the new democratic Islamist one). For Libya and Syria all options are
open, but the structural conditions favourable for a democratic outcome are
hardly present, and the syndrome of post-revolutionary radicalisation cannot be
excluded.
The most striking feature of the electoral results from the Arab Spring, in
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, has been the uniform success of moderate Islamist
parties, with the Turkish AK party model having achieved a breakthrough as a
reference in Arab world politics.
A general point concerns time horizons. History may be accelerating. But still
the overwhelming message of history is that our subject matter – the passage of
post-revolutionary regime developments from the initial libertarian euphoria to
soundly functioning democracy – has long time horizons of decades or centuries.
Modern technologies of the internet and mobile phones have greatly facilitated
the mobilisation of the ‘street’ as protest movement. The ‘street’ has lost its fear,
and so can be expected to come out again in force when power is abused. But
this does not assure soundly functioning democracy. There could be a lot of the
zig-zag model ahead, with recurrent uprisings and regime changes.
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Table 1: Oil & Gas Exports per capita (data 2009)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2010,
World dataBank Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities, CIA World Factbook 2011 (for popu-
lation in the Palestinian Territories) and own calculations.
Note: The value of gas export for Qatar is an approximation since the exact gas prices were not available.
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Qatar 1,639 63 890 38 981
United Arab Emirates 4,908 70 364 14 337
Kuwait 3,536 46 557 13 167
Bahrain 1,039 8 915 8 580
Oman 2,883 21 718 7 533
Saudi Arabia 25,519 163 282 6 398
Libya 6,428 38 756 6 029
Algeria 35,600 60 809 1 708
Iraq 31,234 38 243 1 224
Yemen 23,687 4 565 193
Tunisia 10,435 1 953 187
Egypt 76,800 13 658 178
Syria 20,127 3 305 164
Morocco 31,514 281 9
Jordan 5,980 0 0
Lebanon 3,857 0 0
Palestinian Territories 4,226 0 0
Total: 289,412 Total: 536 296 Average: 1 834
Norway 4,483 69 226 15 442
Venezuela 28,611 54 201 1 894
Iran 74,100 61 888 835
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Table 2: Democracy Index 2010
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
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Lebanon 86 5.82 7.92 3.93 6.67 5.00 5.59
Palestinian Territories 93 5.44 7.83 2.86 8.33 4.38 3.82
Iraq 111 4.00 4.33 0.79 6.11 3.75 5.00
Kuwait 114 3.88 3.58 4.29 3.33 4.38 3.82
Morocco 116 3.79 3.50 4.64 1.67 5.00 4.12
Jordan 117 3.74 3.17 4.64 3.33 3.75 3.82
Bahrain 122 3.49 2.58 3.57 2.78 5.00 3.53
Algeria 125 3.44 2.17 2.21 2.78 5.63 4.41
Qatar 137 3.09 0.00 3.21 2.22 5.63 4.41
Egypt 138 3.07 0.83 3.21 2.78 5.00 3.53
Oman 143 2.86 0.00 3.57 2.22 4.38 4.12
Tunisia 144 2.79 0.00 2.86 2.22 5.63 3.24
Yemen 146 2.64 1.33 1.79 3.89 5.00 1.18
United Arab Emirates 148 2.52 0.00 3.57 1.11 5.00 2.94
Syria 152 2.31 0.00 2.50 1.67 5.63 1.76
Libya 158 1.94 0.00 2.14 1.11 5.00 1.47
Saudi Arabia 160 1.84 0.00 2.86 1.11 3.75 1.47
Iran 158 1.94 0.00 3.21 2.22 2.50 1.76
Norway 1 9.80 10.00 9.64 10.00 9.38 10.00
Venezuela 96 5.18 6.17 3.93 5.56 4.38 5.88
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CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN EU-MEDITERRANEAN 
RELATIONS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
ROSA BALFOUR
When the Arab Spring shook the world
Early enthusiasm for the Arab Spring has become, for many observers, gloom
for an Arab winter, with growing preoccupations that Tunisia will become a
lone rather than leading star. The resistance of the Syrian regime in the face of
increasing international isolation, risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East, and the general uncertainty over political developments in the region are
interpreted as signs that the Arab world will not democratise soon.
While it would have been unrealistic to expect democracy to be smoothly ush-
ered in, this approach does not do justice to the changes that societies in the
Arab world are manifesting. Even if the revolutionary movements are not faring
well in electoral competitions, the empowerment and mobilisation of people
represent the most significant change in the region. Syrian opposition is resisting
repression; Tahrir Square could be the location of a second revolutionary wave,
with various opposition groups and civil society activists protesting against the
failing transition led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
These manifestations of empowerment, mobilisation, and freedom of expres-
sion and association will be hard to repress for any possible regime return. Even
the Arab League, in trying to deal with the crisis in Syria, eventually took
unprecedented steps moving away from its traditional policy of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other states.
These changes will not lead to predetermined outcomes. We will see snakes
changing their skin but not their nature, with old regimes or parts of them sur-
viving under a different guise, new forms of authoritarianism, or a greater plu-
ralism which might not reflect the political preferences for liberal democracy of
many actors, including the EU. The region remains in a state of flux and the only
predictable short-term scenario is one of uncertainty.
The months since the first uprisings have revealed how the important actors in
this environment have also changed. The US is backtracking on its role, at least
in the Western Mediterranean, and expects greater involvement of Europe; Tur-
key has pursued what appear to be some U-turns from previously good relations
with Israel and Syria. Now, it is supporting the opposition to Bashar Assad,
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including to defecting military representatives, and the government is reposi-
tioning itself as a model for Islamic democracy. The Arab League has been mak-
ing unexpected decisions by supporting the intervention in Libya, and by first
seeking a solution to the Syrian crisis and then by opting for unprecedented
sanctioning measures.
Individual countries could move in the direction of greater pluralism and
democracy, like Tunisia, see a return of forms of authoritarianism, or bring con-
servative religious and ultimately non-democratic parties to power, as signs from
Egypt’s electoral process suggest. Alliances between secular and faith-based par-
ties to keep a democratic transformation on track will not always be possible
given the scepticism over the agenda of some Islamic parties in the region and
elsewhere. Further upheavals in other countries which so far have opted for
partial reform engineered from above also cannot be excluded, especially in a
context of an economic crisis in which it is increasingly difficult to address the
socio-economic roots of the changes taking place in the region. Finally, a degen-
eration of repression, violence and even war cannot be excluded, especially in
the context of Iran’s unsolved confrontation with the international community.
Evaluating the EU’s Response: Changes
The Arab Spring has also challenged many of the assumptions upon which inter-
national policies towards the region were based, such as the equation between
the political stability in North Africa and the Middle East and the consequent
containment of security risks, such as terrorism, emigration, socio-economic
upheaval. The belief that pursuing economic liberalisation would lead to a
degree of political reform within the framework created by authoritarianism
was also shattered by the mobilisation of protesters demanding not just bread
and butter but also dignity and freedom of expression. This exposed the myth
of Arab exceptionalism, based on culturalist interpretations of ‘Islam’ being
incompatible with democratic aspirations.
These assumptions underpinned EU policies, based on setting up normative
frameworks for gradual economic and legislative adaptation of (some) neigh-
bouring countries, which did not challenge the nature of the regime with whom
the EU cooperated on a number of important regional dossiers. This also
entailed keeping Islam out of the political game, seen as the only force capable
of undermining the regimes. As it turned out, even this proved a myth: the upris-
ings were secular in nature and faith-based parties made their entry only at a
later stage, successfully positioning themselves as key actors in the newly plural-
ist countries.
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After zigzagging between first supporting the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt
and then the uprising against Qaddafi, the EU has officially recognised that its
status quo policies were, quite simply, wrong. But whether it has seized upon
these extraordinary changes to create a new set of relations with its Southern
neighbours governed by different principles, assumptions, and objectives is a
different matter.
The EU has responded to the Arab Spring with a broad range of tools, from
humanitarian assistance, the revision of some modalities of long-term program-
matic policies, sanctioning measures, and military interventionism on part of
some member states through NATO. The mobilisation of such a wide array of
tools per se represents a shift: one of the outstanding features of Euro-Mediter-
ranean relations was the gap between the creation of broad frameworks and
plentiful initiatives and their non-implementation, leaving much of the sub-
stance of politics to bilateral relations between individual countries. The ques-
tion is whether the sum of these tools indicates a shift in EU thinking about its
relations with North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), and whether it prel-
udes to a qualitative change in relations between the two shores of the Mediter-
ranean. In turn, understanding the changes and continuities in EU policies will
require some incursions into the limits and problems of yesterday’s Euro-Medi-
terranean relations.
In March and May the Commission produced two Communications6 which
contained the main points for a renewal of Euro-Mediterranean relations, based
largely on a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, the ENP
should not be understood as coterminous of EU foreign policy, which involves
a much broader range of actors and processes, including dynamics pertaining to
relations of the member states with individual countries in the region. The pro-
posals coming from the Commission and the High Representative require mem-
ber states’ cooperation for their delivery and implementation: alongside the
logic of the Neighbourhood Policy, political dynamics, the positioning of the
member states, the context in which they operate all need to be included in the
analysis.
The EU has built its revised policies towards the MENA countries around four
pillars: refined conditionality, greater differentiation among countries, new tools
to support democracy-building, and a stronger focus on sustainable socio-eco-
6. European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol-
icy (2011), A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,
COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels: 8 March 2011; European Commission and High Representative of the of
the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2011), A New Response to a Changing
Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2011) 303, Brussels: 25 May
2011.
AN ARAB SPRINGBOARD FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY?
30
nomic development. Branded with ‘more for more’, the EU has opted for focuss-
ing on the incentives to characterise a new form of engagement. The ‘three Ms’
– ‘more money, more market access, more mobility’ – are the incentives on offer:
a more targeted use of financial and economic assistance (there is little more
money – the challenge is the better use of resources); addressing some of the
socio-economic challenges in each of the countries; the goal of reaching a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), with the Commission’s
commitment to work on lifting the protectionist barriers that have so far limited
market access for the MENA countries; and the offer of ‘mobility partnerships’
to make population movement easier for some citizens from the region, starting
from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. The disincentives are described in relation
to the sanctioning measures which have been progressively put in place against
the Syrian regime, from the freezing of financial assets to trade and oil embar-
goes.
The emphasis on engagement does not represent a significant departure from
previous EU policy, which over the past twenty years has increasingly favoured
finding paths of cooperation with partner governments. The difference, at least
on paper, is that democratic commitments appear stronger conditions for gain-
ing the additional incentives.
The new SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive
Growth) allocates €350 million for 2011 and 2012 for the region. Tunisia and
Egypt are also the recipients of additional financial resources found through the
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (respectively reaching a total of
€160 million and €449 million for 2011-2013, far from the requested needs of
these countries). This reflects an attempt to differentiate between countries,
given the greater diversity within the region, rather than the one-size-fits-all
approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of the ENP.
In truth, the ENP did contain elements of differentiation and conditionality,
offering more integration with the EU to those countries making greater
progress according to agreed benchmarks. The difference now would be in the
EU sticking to its principles and promises, the delivery of the incentives (the
Commission’s papers speak of ‘mutual accountability’), and in the general way
in which the EU positions itself since the Arab Spring.
EU public diplomacy has been emphasizing its ‘listening mode’: rather than set
out a list of conditions to be met by the partner countries, its ambition is to
strengthen relations with those countries which ask for greater engagement on
part of Brussels. The EU-Tunisia Task Force, which met for the first time in late
September 2011 and gathered representatives from the Tunisian and European
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governments, the EU’s Commission and External Action Service, the private sec-
tor, financial institutions, reflects this change. The EU’s level of engagement will
depend on the requests coming from the countries, and its level of ambition will
follow.
In recognition of the false basis of the paradigms whereby stability would lead
to greater security, and economic reform to more political pluralism, the EU has
also shifted its attention to identifying ways to promote ‘deep democracy’ by
focussing efforts towards giving civil society a stronger role in national and
international politics. The European Neighbourhood Review established the
creation of a Civil Society Facility (€22 million for 2011-13), including social
media development. The European Endowment for Democracy, to be created as
an autonomous body capable of responding to funding requests more flexibly
and rapidly than existing EU instruments, would allow the EU to support non-
registered NGOs and political movements and actors including, at least in the-
ory, faith-based groups. If the EED lives up to these expectations (its ultimate
shape and mandate is still under discussion), it would represent a significant
departure from the EU’s traditional non-partisanship in relating to political
dynamics in third countries. In terms of resources, however, EU contributions
remain a drop in the ocean, compared to US democracy promotion or Saudi
Arabia’s support of grassroots organizations.
Evaluating the EU’s Response: Continuities
These revisions of existing policies will have to be evaluated against their prac-
tical implementation. In the early days of the Arab Spring there were many calls
from member states for ‘Marshall Plans’ for North Africa and the Middle East
and for breaking down trade protectionism, coupled with a race to get visibility
in the region and at home through official visits to the uprising countries. None
of these proposals have materialised; no initiative has been presented by the
member states, including those which have traditionally pushed for grand plans
to engage the two shores of the Mediterranean; additional resources provided
have been through international financial institutions (including the agreement
to extend the mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment to the MENA countries) rather than by the member states.
Hence, the problems ahead are likely to reflect the limits which previous policies
encountered: delivery on part of the member states. The ‘three Ms’ all require
that the obstacles to free trade are removed, that greater resources are commit-
ted beyond those available during the last couple of years of the ENPI, which
will depend on the outcome of the budgetary negotiations for 2014-2020, that
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member states agree to offering mobility incentives beyond student visas
through the Erasmus Mundus programme.
Delivery problems notwithstanding, there are some broader issues that have so
far not been addressed in the EU’s policy revisions. The use of political condi-
tionality has always been hindered by problems of double standards, credibility,
impact, and differential treatment of partners. The Communication’s proposals
treat conditionality as a tool, underestimating its political nature. The link
between conditionality and differentiation also needs to be problematised. Cou-
pled with the differentiated approach, it is hard to see the compass regulating
the new system. Which is the middle line on the basis of which the ‘more’ and
the ‘less’ are defined? The practice of dealing with individual countries will tell
more than the intentions written on paper.
So far, the EU is certainly stepping up its dialogue and commitment towards
Tunisia, a country which is increasingly proving a model for transition and
poses few difficult issues for the EU to deal with. Morocco’s good relations with
the EU have been maintained throughout the Arab Spring and the country was
offered similar incentives to those offered to Tunis even before King Mohammed
VI passed constitutional changes and held elections that were freer than ever
before. After the military intervention in Libya, the EU has been keen to set up
a Delegation in Tripoli, support the transitional government, work towards
unblocking the asset freeze (a move that Egypt has not yet benefited from and
that was initiated with regard to Tunisia’s assets only when the Task Force met),
and integrate the country in the EU-created regional frameworks such as the
ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean. The other countries which have not
experienced upheaval leading to political change have seen continuity in their
relations with the EU, with Brussels supporting the measures that Algeria and
Jordan have taken to address some of the socio-economic complaints that had
led to protest.
Egypt represents one of the most difficult cases because of the complexity of its
transition and its importance in the region. In a nutshell, any policy towards
Egypt encapsulates many of the dilemmas of EU policy towards the South Med-
iterranean: Israel-Palestine relations, the role of political Islam, the fight against
terrorism, trade and energy interests. Whatever the conduct and outcomes of the
successive electoral processes for the parliament (which will end in January but
are so far prizing Islamic parties, including the most conservative Salafi political
party) and the new President, European capitals will want to ensure that one of
the most important countries in the region does not change its cooperation with
the international community on key issues such as the Middle East, and in par-
ticular on the treaty with Israel. Indeed, the EU has been extremely cautious in
AN ARAB SPRINGBOARD FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY?
33
positioning itself towards the developments in the country, limiting its public
diplomacy to issuing statements condemning sectarian conflict and the violent
repression of Tahrir Square demonstrators before the start of the November
2011 parliamentary elections.
Some of the governments refuse the notion of conditionality per se, as it under-
mines the national emancipation that is being achieved, and the traditional
attachment to sovereignty and national identity. The more democratic the new
governments, the more assertive they are likely to be about their identity, their
relations with Europe and their position in the world – with positions that might
not be of liking to European capitals. In short, while the revision of condition-
ality illustrates good intentions on part of the EU, it is not reconciled with the
reality of pragmatism that Brussels continues to show towards the region, dem-
onstrating a strong degree of continuity with pre-Arab Spring policies.
The new intentions with regard to conditionality do not reflect a deeper analysis
of whether the EU enjoys the conditions of leverage, attraction, incentives and
relevance to be able to exercise it. In many ways, the revision of conditionality
seems to reflect an internal EU demand for a redefinition of ‘ethical’ standards
for engagement, following the exposure of EU contradictions in its relations
with dictators. Externally, its ambitions to fine-tune conditionality do not sit
easily with the ‘listening mode’ that public diplomacy has pushed especially with
the transitional governments, which so far has translated in reactive political
positioning following developments and requests coming from the MENA
countries (with Tunisia and, to an extent, Libya being more forthcoming than
Egypt) rather than in proactive policy seeking to redefine the Mediterranean
space.
Indeed, the next step of rethinking regional integration and forms of aggregation
has not yet been addressed, and the issue has been dealt with briefly by reference
to the Union for the Mediterranean which, with its new Secretary General, has
been seeking to demonstrate a renewed relevance. Past frameworks have been
hostage to the regional complexities rather than a vehicle for dialogue about the
problems. In many ways it would be premature to discuss new forms of regional
aggregation so long as Syria, a lynchpin between the greater Middle East and
the South Mediterranean, is in arms. But, there are some behind the scenes dis-
cussions about sub-regional integration (such as in the Maghreb, or through the
5+5 Group), and about the composition of future regional formats, whether
they should be extended to the Gulf countries, or narrowed down to smaller
groups, and what kind of political dialogue should be developed. The High Rep-
resentative, for instance, has demonstrated throughout the Arab Spring that she
gives great importance to the role of regional actors such as the Arab League and
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the African Union, yet the EU does not have an established dialogue with the
Arab League.
Plus ça change?
If the upheavals in the region have merited parallels with epoch-making histor-
ical events such as 1848 or 1989, at least for the citizens there, this has not led
to a clean slate on part of the EU. Many of the difficulties met over the past two
decades remain: some were related to the regional context, which is changing
and requires new analysis and understanding; some were ascribable to the EU
internal set up, regarding what the aims of EU policy were, the degree of con-
sensus around them, and the decision-making process leading to these aims
being reflected in foreign policy initiatives. The policy revisions carried out in
2011 can improve the mechanisms of the EU tools and the means through which
these may be applied, such as the creation of the EU-Tunisia Task Force. There
are indications that EU officials are engaging with a number of new themes,
such as expanding contacts with civil society actors, with political parties,
understanding local dynamics and conditions. These positive steps, together, do
not amount to a more vigorous analysis of past shortcomings and future chal-
lenges.
Little has been mobilized resource-wise, and further commitments, which are
being proposed by the Commission for the next financial framework, might
open up a Pandora’s box on the balance between the EU’s Eastern and Southern
neighbourhoods. Improving the delivery of incentives and the mechanisms for
the implementation of the new initiatives, addressing the principle of condition-
ality and how it may or may not work in a context of non-enlargement, rethink-
ing the terms of engagement with North Africa and the Middle East as a whole,
would all require greater clarity about the aims of European and EU foreign
policy.
Each of the innovations introduced in the EU’s policy revision poses further
issues which lead to a broader cluster of problems that have characterized EU-
Mediterranean relations at least since 1995.
The aim of supporting ‘deep democracy’ through the Civil Society Facility and
the European Endowment for Democracy, for instance, raises questions about
which groups to support (and whether to include faith-based parties), and what
to do when electoral results do not match European expectations about the
management of its key priorities, as was the case with Hamas’s victory in the
Palestinian elections in 2006.
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The implications of the Arab Spring for the Middle East Peace Process also need
to be investigated. Freer electoral processes may lead to the formation of gov-
ernments which are hostile to Israel and could change the environment in which
negotiations may take place.
Applying sanctioning measures is becoming increasingly problematic. Targeted
economic and financial sanctions have not had a strong enough impact to shift
the position of the government of Syria (nor of Iran). But energy related sanc-
tions have detrimental and uneven consequences on EU member states, which
have differentiated forms of dependence on oil and gas coming from the Middle
East. Here, foreign policy sits uneasily with national energy relations and with
the EU’s emerging external energy policy, which sees the neighbourhood as a
priority area.
Managing population movements and demographic change was one of the key
underlying objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and this aim is
reiterated in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. Yet a minor pop-
ulation movement due to upheaval in Tunisia and Libya and a humanitarian
crisis in the area led to disarray in and among some EU member states and to
the possibility of a breakdown in the Schengen’s system solidarity mechanisms.
All the changes introduced by the reviews proposed by the Commission and the
High Representative have implications for these issues – migration, energy,
Israel-Palestine. On this broader picture, the EU has been notoriously divided,
and the patterns of diversity vary according to the issue at stake. The past year
since the start of the Arab Spring has not shown many signs, on part of the EU
member states or of the EU institutions, to address the heart of the problems that
have featured in relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Perhaps
as part of a mea culpa for past unsavoury alliances with the likes of Qaddafi,
the EU is emphasizing the modesty of its ambition and its desire to be more
responsive to internal demands. But there is a fine line between ‘listening’ and
merely reacting. There certainly is a need for the EU to step down from its ped-
estal of pre-packaged policies to address the real issues on the ground. However,
this does not mean that the EU should not reflect on how the Mediterranean is
changing and that it cannot help shape of the region’s future.
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A EUROPEAN MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC AREA TO 
KICK-START ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ANDRÉ SAPIR AND GEORG ZACHMANN
Economic factors have and will continue to play an important role in the polit-
ical development of the southern Mediterranean countries. Economic discontent
– of unemployed youth in particular – was a key motivation for the events now
termed “Arab Spring.” Likewise, future economic development in the Southern
Mediterranean countries will be crucial for the success of the newly established
governments in the region.
Europe has historically been engaged in the region both politically and econom-
ically. However, the policies of the European Union intended to promote eco-
nomic transition in southern Mediterranean countries were not particularly suc-
cessful. The limited success of these policies may be due to several factors:
Firstly, the European offer was restricted in scope and size. In terms of scope,
agriculture trade and migration were largely absent from the agenda. In terms
of size, the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument in 2007-2010 disbursed
about 1.7 bn Euro in the region, or about 2.60 Euro per capita per year. Thus,
technical assistance, limited financial assistance, and the free trade of manufac-
tured goods were the main offers of the EU. Secondly, most southern Mediter-
ranean governments at this time had limited interest in deep economic reforms,
as these would have infringed upon the economic interests of the ruling elites
and their main constituencies. The limited offer from the EU was insufficient to
overcome the vested interests which blocked economic transition. Lastly, the
sizable bilateral assistance programmes of individual EU member states pre-
vented an effective European quid-pro-quo to encourage economic reforms in
the Southern Mediterranean.
Under changing conditions, there is a window of opportunity for encouraging
economic transition in the Southern Mediterranean countries. European sup-
port could play an important role in this process. A pro-active European policy
might not only directly improve living conditions of many millions of people; it
might also stabilize reform-oriented governments and enable them to conduct
economic reforms able to unlock growth in the region.
In the next section, the current economic situation is briefly introduced and rea-
sons for modest development are sketched out. In the third section two possible
scenarios for the economic development in the region are described. In the last
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section, a proposal for a European Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) is
lined out.
Status Quo
Despite significant differences, the five Southern Mediterranean Countries
(SMCs) have much in common with each other (Table 1). All five have young
populations and are growing, but lack employment opportunities. Only Libya
stands out from the group as the least populated and the richest, with a vast
endowment of natural resources. The other four are relatively poor, with signif-
icant agricultural populations and out-migration.
Table 1: Major indicators for the latest available year
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund, Historical Public
Debt database and World Economic Outlook (October 2010); UNDP, Human Development Report
(2010); Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Sec-
retariat, World Population Prospects (2008 Revision).
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Population in millions 34.9 83.0 6.4 32.0 10.4 166.7
GDP (current US$ billions) 141 188 62 91 40 522
GDP per capita (current US$) 4029 2270 9714 2811 3792 3131
GDP growth (average % 2005-2009) 2.9 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.8 5.1
Public debt (in percent of GDP) 14 76 – 48 43 43
Agricultural employment (% total 
employment)
20.7 31.2 – 40.9 – 31.0
Agricultural added value (in % of total 
added value)
8.3 15.3 2.3 14.0 11.0 11.3
Manufacturing added value (in % of 
total added value)
4.7 15.5 4.7 15.1 16.6 11.1
Mining, utilities added value (in % of 
total added value)
47.0 14.2 58.8 4.7 6.9 26.1
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.3 -1.8 15.0 -5.4 -3.1 0.1
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 60 36 73 51 85 53
Share of population aged 15-24 in % 20.5 20.2 17.3 19.7 19.3 20.0
Unemployment in % 13.8 8.7 – 9.6 14.2 10.3
Net migration per 1000 inhabitants -0.8 -0.8 0.6 -2.7 -0.4 -1.1
Human Development Index (2010 
value)
.67 .62 .76 .57 .68 .63
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In 2009 the per capita GDP in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia was
between 15-28 percent of the corresponding EU27 figure. In the following sec-
tions, three reasons for this modest development will be discussed.
Market
Most SMCs do feature a significant private sector. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) transition indicators clearly show
that the degree of privatisation and liberalisation in the SMCs in 2004 (the last
year for which comparable data is available) clearly surpass the baseline value
given by EBRD to the communist countries (typically 1,0) before their transi-
tion. However, the SMCs are even farther away from the theoretical benchmark
value of 5,0.
Figure 1: EBRD Market Indicator, 2004
Source: EBRD
By 2010, the SMCs were able to attract a significant stock of foreign direct
investment (average 32% of their GDP). This illustrates that the countries are
more open and more attractive to foreign capital than other middle-income
developing countries (average 17% of their GDP). Still, when compared to EU
countries, the economic development in SMCs appears constrained by a high
degree of public intervention7 and insufficient market reforms.8
7. Sala-i-Martin, X. and Artadi, E.V., ‘Economic growth and investment in the Arab world’, Discussion
Papers 0203-08, Columbia University, Department of Economics, 2002.
8. Nabli, M.K. and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, M-A (2007) ‘Reform complementarities and economic
growth in the Middle East and North Africa’, Journal of International Development, 2007, 19(1) pp. 17-
54.
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Regulation
The quality of political/administrative institutions is a key determinant of eco-
nomic performance.9 Strong institutions, it has been argued both theoretically
and empirically, are a key factor in growth.10 SMCs are severely lacking in
strong institutions when compared with the rest of the world. According to the
World Bank, all SMCs were in the lower half of the 210 countries in the sample.
Per average governance indicators assessed by the study, eighty percent of these
countries were better governed than Libya and Algeria; seventy percent were
better governed than Egypt; and half of the countries were better governed than
Morocco and Tunisia. Thus, weak institutions may significantly obstruct eco-
nomic development in the SMCs.
Figure 2: Governance Indicator 2010
Source: World Bank (2011) World governance indicators (governance performance: -2.5=weakest; 0=
average; 2.5=strongest of 213 countries).
9. Méon, P-G and K. Sekkat, ‘Does the Quality of Institutions Limit the MENA’s Integration in the World
Economy?’, The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 27(9), pp. 1475-1498.
10. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of
Long-Run Growth’. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth,
Volume 1a (Amsterdam and San Diego: Elsevier, North-Holland, 2005, pp. 385-472).
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Human Capital
In terms of the quantity and quality of education, the SMCs lag significantly
behind Europe and the United States. Algeria has the highest educational attain-
ment in terms of average years of schooling for total population aged 25 and
over, with 7.61 years of schooling on average. However, this is considerably
lower than the average of 13.27 years in the United States, and an average of
10.59 years within the EU27.
Moreover, education in the SMCs does not seem to be well targeted at the local
labour market. University graduates in Algeria and Morocco constitute a small
proportion of the total unemployed, but have the highest unemployment rate,
indicating that these countries suffer from a low return on education, which
eventually translates to a low propensity to stay in school/university.
In the five countries unemployment is between 9 percent (Egypt) and 30 percent
(Libya). Youth unemployment in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia is above 30 percent.11
The inability of these economies to fully employ their present human capital leads
to high migration pressure and keeps the countries at the brink of social unrest.
Figure 3: Average years of schooling for total population aged 25 and over in 2010
Source: Barro-Lee (2011)12.
11. According to OECD, “in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, youth unemployment is estimated at 37%,
66% and nearly 68%.” See OECD (2009) ‘The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries’,
Regional Note North Africa, Flore Gubert and Christophe J. Nordman, IRD, DIAL, Paris, p. 23.
12. Barro, R. and J-W Lee (2011) updated database Barro, R. and J-W Lee (2010) ‘A New Data Set of
Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010’, NBER Working Paper No. 15902.
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Transition Scenarios
With respect to economic development, we will present two possible transition
scenarios for Southern Mediterranean Countries.
The optimistic scenario is inspired by the development of the former communist
countries that became new member states (NMS-8). The success of the NMS-8
was based on the combination of their favorable initial conditions, the domestic
policy decisions taken, and the European response. Based on their relatively
good initial conditions, the EU established strong trade relations, granted (ini-
tially limited) labour mobility, offered substantial transition funds and, even in
1993, extend the prospect of EU membership. These measures were conditional
on the implementation of economic and political reforms by the NMS-8. The
offer of EU accession, the visible effects of European funds, and the transition-
induced improvements on quality-of-life, meant that much of the population
was willing to abandon legacy privileges such as food and fuel subsidies. Fur-
thermore, the flat distribution of assets at the beginning of the transition limited
the power of vested interests. Consequently, bold economic reforms were polit-
ically sustainable. In the mid-term, economic reforms led to substantial and
inclusive growth. Consequently, further reforms were politically feasible, and
equipped the countries for ultimate EU membership.
A similar – though probably more modest – path is conceivable in the SMCs if
three conditions are met. The first and most crucial condition is that the SMCs
are themselves interested in a path towards stronger economic integration with
the EU. The necessary domestic reforms can be politically sustained only based
on a large societal consensus. The second condition would be that the EU is
willing to credibly offer a perspective for stronger economic integration. This
offer would have to go beyond merchandise trade. The SMCs could be incentiv-
ized to carry out necessary reforms only if the EU includes provisions for free
movement of labour and agricultural products. And third, a jointly agreed proc-
ess would be needed to combine push and pull factors for reforms. A reform
roadmap in the SMCs, as well as European technical and financial assistance,
would represent the push factors. A quid-pro-quo consisting of certain EU steps
to liberalise the movement of people and goods from the SMCs, conditional
upon the completion of reforms, would be the pull factor.
The pessimistic scenario builds on the experience in the former Soviet repub-
lics.13 The former Soviet republics started with a lower level of economic devel-
opment and an absence of pre-communist economic and personal freedom. For
13. We refer to all countries of the former Soviet Union with the exception of the Baltic countries.
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this and other reasons, their institutions started from a significantly weaker
position, and many of the former Soviet republics still endure fights for property
rights which prevent investment and distract from economic development.
Meanwhile, levels of corruption are higher and there is less trust in markets. The
EU’s response to transition in the former Soviet republics was cautious. It was
unable to break the vicious cycle of: (i) reluctance to reform because of fear of
instability and (ii) limited growth. The EU did not offer the possibility of EU
membership, free trade, or labour mobility. The technical and financial assist-
ance (TACIS14: about €2 per capita per year) certainly helped to improve insti-
tutional capacity in these countries, but a lack of clear conditionality aligned to
a long-term strategy meant the transition was hampered.
The economic growth potential that could be unleashed by transition in the
SMCs is probably lower than that in the former Soviet republics at the beginning
of their transition. First, in terms of factor endowment, the SMCs possess a less
educated labour force and an inferior infrastructure. Second, some of the poten-
tial gains from transition present in the former Soviet republics in 1990 have
already been reaped in the economic systems of the SMCs: the allocation of
goods and production factors is already market-based to a great extent, and the
countries are part of international value chains. Furthermore, strong vested
interest and weak institutions are unfavorable conditions for deep economic
reforms. Therefore, the vicious cycle experienced by the former Soviet republics
appears to be the default development in the SMCs.
Between 2005 and 2009, GDP growth in the SMCs was significant (5.1 percent
per year), but was clearly socially unsustainable, as indicated by the high youth
unemployment, and as demonstrated by recent events. However, there is signif-
icant room for improvement. The quality of regulation in SMCs is poor. Liber-
alisation remains incomplete in many sectors and the state interferes pervasively
with the pricing mechanism (e.g. continued price controls on food and fuel).
Additionally, international trade is constrained by trade barriers, and certain
sectors are cut off from foreign investment. These factors constrain market-
based development. Overcoming this through economic reform could provide a
significant boost to growth. However, serious reforms would produce highly
visible losers, such as employees in protected sectors, recipients of subsidised
food, and owners of economic rents. The scale of the necessary structural adjust-
ment (e.g. high agricultural employment) would make such political reforms
unsustainable if the economic gains do not accrue rapidly and cannot be quickly
redistributed to the losers. The alternative would be conditional outside assist-
14. TACIS: Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. According to the EU, “the
Community’s TACIS programme encourages democratisation, the strengthening of the rule of law and the
transition to a market economy”.
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ance and a credible political project that encourages the population and politi-
cians to tolerate a limited period of social hardship.
A Perspective for EU-Mediterranean Relations
The EU has – at least since the start of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in
199515 – accepted that it plays an important role in the southern Mediterranean
region. For the last fifteen years, EU policy towards the SMCs has been struc-
tured around trade, migration and assistance.
In terms of trade, EU liberalisation so far has mainly covered industrial goods,
while agricultural products, which are vital for the SMCs, are largely excluded.
Negotiations to open up agricultural trade and to liberalise trade in services and
investment started in 2008 but are not yet concluded.
Migration is considered to be one of the priority areas of the Euro-Mediterra-
nean Partnership, but little progress has been achieved because of conflicting
interests.
Assistance to the SMCs, meanwhile, has been substantial. EU support to the
Mediterranean countries16 has been the second largest European programme for
external assistance, allocating almost €9 billion between 1995 and 2006. Yet,
because of the lack of conviction and ownership on both sides, this support is
not seen as having been very effective.17 In 2007-2010 the new European Neigh-
bourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) spent €7.20 and €5.20 per capita
per year for Tunisia and Morocco, respectively (by comparison Ukraine receives
€2.70 per capita per year from the ENPI). Bilateral aid from individual EU gov-
ernments, and EIB financing for the region, are also substantial.
But the main problem with the EU approach so far is that it has been piecemeal,
with no real effort to bundle together its trade, migration, and assistance policies
15. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (aka Barcelona Process) was launched by 15 EU members and
14 Mediterranean partners, as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. It seeks to
create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity. Its main pillars are a political and
security dialogue, the gradual establishment of a free-trade area and promoting intercultural dialogue.
16. Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Occupied Palestinian authority, Morocco,
Israel.
17. The Nair Report (2001) on the Barcelona Process to the European Parliament highlighted the lack of
strategic vision as one of the reasons for the failure of the policy. According to Natorski (2008) the low
level of intra-European coherence, the limited and slowly disbursed funds as well as the lack of a sense of
co-ownership and cooperation between the partners made MEDA ineffective. Please see Nair, S. (2001)
Report on the Commission Communication on relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region:
reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security
and Defense Policy, European Parliament, Final A5-0009/2001.
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into an overall strategy to support development in the SMCs. The responsibility
lies, however, not only with the EU but also with the southern Mediterranean
partners, which have not shown determination to implement the necessary
social, political, and economic reforms.
The events in Egypt and Tunisia open up the tantalising prospect of a transition
towards a new social, political, and economic era – both in the SMCs and in the
Mediterranean region as whole. Whether or not these countries will be able to
transform their societies and follow a path towards sustainable development
will be determined first and foremost by their own efforts. But there is much that
Europe can and must do to ensure a favourable outcome which is in its own
interest. By including the SMCs the size of the internal market would increase
from a current 520 million customers (EU27 + EFTA) to almost 700 million. A
greater market would allow customers to benefit from more choice and lower
prices, while companies could sell their products to more clients. Additionally,
if circular migration schemes were to be implemented, the SMCs may be able to
provide skilled labor to augment the aging European human capital. Thus, the
creation of an EMEA may entail several long-term benefits for Europe: higher
economic growth through increased specialization and catch-up in the SMCs,
increased supply of human capital, greater energy security, and a preservation
of economic weight in the global market.
Europe must provide short- and medium-term financial assistance to help the
SMCs, and should mobilise its development banks to help foster transforma-
tion. But above all, the EU should define a new strategy towards these countries
spelling out a credible and comprehensive approach to the Euro-Mediterranean
relationship, which is so far lacking. The approach must include short- and
medium-term concrete and measurable steps designed to foster the transition
process.
The EU should offer the SMCs full accession to the EU single market by 2030,
provided the countries meet the necessary conditions in terms of meeting the
relevant acquis communautaire. This would entail the progressive elimination
of all barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and labour. Addi-
tionally, this would entail the adoption by the SMCs of all the rules and policies
linked to the single market. It would also include access to specific transfer
mechanisms designed to foster and offset costs of economic, social, and environ-
mental convergence. For example, the SMCs would get access to specific struc-
tural funds and be allowed to issue emission permits usable in the EU’s emission
trading system (ETS).
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If successful, the process would imply that, by 2030, Europe and the Mediterra-
nean countries would constitute a vast Euro-Med Economic Area (EMEA) sim-
ilar to the present European Economic Area (EEA) that links the EU to Iceland,
Norway and Liechtenstein. At that stage, the Mediterranean countries would
effectively share “everything but institutions” with the EU, a concept already
put forward by the European Commission back in 2002.18 This concept is in the
spirit of extending to Europe’s neighbours the set of economic, social and polit-
ical principles and standards that define the EU itself.
Achieving this long term vision requires bold but gradual steps on both shores
of the Mediterranean. While the SMCs would have to gradually implement
European legislation and transform their economies, the EU would have to sup-
port the countries’ efforts financially and demonstrate its commitment to the
long-term vision by gradually opening its markets to goods, services, capital,
and labour. The hope is to generate the kind of virtuous circle of economic
reforms and sustainable growth which helped the countries of central and east-
ern Europe throughout their transition period.
Membership in the EMEA should therefore be viewed as the ultimate goal of a
process involving a quid pro quo approach in which the benefits offered by the
EU are conditional on the achievement of clearly defined transition milestones
on the part of the Mediterranean countries.
On the EU side, the key offers would include: a revised trade agreement provid-
ing for the gradual elimination of all remaining barriers to the free circulation
of goods, services, and capital. This would include agricultural products, which
should have front-loaded access to the European market. The permanent access
to the European labour market for certain categories of Mediterranean workers,
especially professionals, should be organised through a ‘Blue Card’ system, a
temporary European work permit for high-skilled foreigners, as proposed by
von Weizsäcker (2006).19 More generally, the EU should do its part to put in
place circular migration schemes. Although its main contribution should be in
terms of regulatory changes (mainly in the area of trade and migration), Europe
should also provide substantial assistance for human capital (including institu-
tional capacity-building) and physical infrastructure development through both
the EU budget and European financial institutions such as the EBRD and the
EIB. An amount of €10 billion per year for a period of 10 years (equivalent of
2.5 per cent of the present GDP of the SMCs) would be sufficient in our view
18. Speech by Romani Prodi in Louvain la Neuve in December 2002.
19. Von Weizsäcker, J., ‘Welcome to Europe’, Policy Brief 2006/03, Brussels, Brueghel, Brussels, 2006.
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and would represent a good investment in the stability of Europe’s southern
neighbourhood.20
On the Mediterranean side, the milestones would include the gradual implemen-
tation of EU economic legislation (such as competition policy, investment pro-
tection and consumer protection), and social and environmental policies. In
order to ensure the success of circular migration schemes, Mediterranean coun-
tries also need to put in place effective legal and institutional mechanisms to
promote the reintegration of returning migrants, including temporary tax
exemptions for entrepreneurs, portable social rights, and retraining pro-
grammes. In general, it would be crucial for the EU to put in place a system of
effective conditionality aimed at the creation of the rule of law in all areas con-
ducive to sustainable development.
There is a significant risk that the high hopes of the local population and of the
international community towards the future economic and political situation in
the Mediterranean countries could turn sour in the coming months due to short-
term economic difficulties. Transition is a long-term process that typically
involves some painful adjustments. Transition therefore needs to be nurtured
with care to ensure it survives. And, because painful structural reforms are dif-
ficult to sustain in the present climate of high expectations, there is a clear dan-
ger that, without short-term successes, the SMC population might quickly turn
to policy-makers who promise populist measures such as legacy industry protec-
tion, and food and fuel subsidies.
Europe can help overcome this dilemma by providing the long-term vision of the
EMEA as a credible expectation for the future. However, such a vision needs to
be accompanied by clear signs of short-term EU action in order to get through
potentially traumatic economic reforms. Additionally, short-term EU action is
needed to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to its future partnership with the
region.
20. This order of magnitude is certainly not unrealistic. At the G8 Deauville Summit in May 2011, Presi-
dent Sarkozy said that “multilateral development banks could provide over €14bn, including €3.5bn
from the EIB, for Egypt and Tunisia for 2011-2013 in support of suitable reform efforts”. He has also
announced that G8 members could increase this effort up to €28bn.
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“RESOURCE-FULL REVOLUTIONS”: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE SOUTHERN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD
DANIEL FIOTT
The recent “Arab Uprisings” brought to head long-standing problems in the
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) with regard to natural resources. While
the thrust of popular discontent was aimed at years of authoritarianism, corrup-
tion, low political reform and high unemployment the role of resources was
important. It is no coincidence, for example, that Tunisian protestors marched
in the streets bearing loaves of bread. Indeed, while many of the oil-exporting
countries in the MENA region enjoyed increased GDP growth during the 1970s,
an increasing population size and labour force combined with slow political
reforms and inequality – particularly among the youth – have resulted in slug-
gish growth and economic fragility since the 1980s.21 While each MENA coun-
try differs in its resource endowment the region’s stocks of agricultural produce,
natural gas, iron ore, oil, phosphates, steel, wood extracts and zinc will play an
increasingly significant role in consolidating the political transitions and dealing
with longer-term problems such as scarcity and climate change.
Many of the MENA region’s resource-rich countries are the focus of the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the EU has consistently
stated the importance of resources such as oil and gas in its relationship with its
southern neighbours Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria and Tunisia. Secure relations with the
southern neighbourhood is essential for the EU when one considers that the
Union is the region’s largest trading partner and that it is strategically dependent
on resources – approximately 8% of the EU’s total crude oil imports come from
its southern neighbours.22 This is to say nothing of the destabilising role a
resource conflict in the MENA would have on the EU.23
21. See: G.T. Abed & H.R. Davoodi, Challenges of Growth and Globalization in the Middle East and
North Africa, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2003), pp. 2-3; and, D. Dasgupta, J. Kel-
ler & T.G. Srinivasan, “Reform and Elusive Growth in the Middle East: What has Happened in the
1990s?”, Middle East and North Africa Paper Series 25 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002).
22. European Commission, “Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the European Union
(EU27) from January to March 2011”. See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/doc/import/coi/eu-
coi-2011-01-03.pdf. (Accessed 20 November 2011).
23. Michael Ross’ studies on the relationship between natural resources and conflict are interesting. He
concludes that oil dependence (e.g. Libya) appears to be linked to the initiation of conflict, and oil and
mineral dependence can be associated with separatist conflicts. See: M. Ross, “What Do We Know About
Natural Resources and Civil War?”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 3 (2004), p. 352.
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In this regard, this chapter seeks to outline what lessons the EU can draw from
the “Arab Uprisings” when it comes to the full gamut of its natural resource
policies. In what ways, if any, does the revised ENP address the issue of resource
security and management as part of a broader EU strategy towards the region?
Answering such questions, this chapter compares the EU’s past resource policies
towards its southern neighbourhood with what it should be doing now after the
political upheavals.
The EU’s Approach Before the “Arab Uprisings”
Before the “Arab Uprisings” the EU had published three ENP strategy papers
(2004, 2006 and 2007), along with a host of country-specific – bi-lateral –
Action Plans, Association Agreements and Country Strategy Papers. Each of
these documents strongly underlined the importance of the EU’s resource rela-
tions vis-à-vis the MENA region, primarily with regard to energy but also agri-
culture and fisheries. The EU’s overall strategy was to ensure security of energy
supplies, and to effectively manage its energy dependency with suppliers (e.g.
Libya) and transit countries (e.g. Tunisia). It also sought greater liberalisation of
the agricultural and fisheries sectors with most countries. Correspondingly the
EU believed that resource interdependence would boost socio-economic devel-
opment and environmental protection in the region.24 There were a number of
common threads running through the EU’s strategy.
Where energy and minerals are concerned the EU calls for convergence between
energy strategies in the southern neighbourhood with the EU’s energy policy
objectives, and the harmonisation of regulatory and legislative environments,25
with a view to the eventual integration of and interoperability between energy
and electricity networks with the EU’s own. The EU is also keen to promote
energy efficiency and the development of renewable energies, plus environmen-
tal protection in the Mediterranean under the Horizon 2020 initiative.26 Finally,
the EU seeks the technological upgrading of energy and mining companies, and
to develop partnerships between European and MENA companies for explora-
tion, production, distribution and processing.27
24. European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper”, COM(2004) 373 final,
Brussels (12 May 2004) p. 17.
25. European Commission, “EU/Egypt Action Plan”, p. 24. See: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf. (Accessed 10 November 2011).
26. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “National Indicative Programme 2011-2013,
Syrian Arab Republic”. See: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_syria_en.pdf.
(Accessed 5 November 2011).
27. European Commission, “EU/Algerian Association Agreement”, (10 October 2005), p.17. See: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:265:0002:0228:EN:PDF. (Accessed 10
November 2011).
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On agriculture, fisheries and water the EU has sought to promote the liberalisa-
tion of agricultural sectors by, for example, encouraging improved food safety
standards so as to allow products to be exported more freely to EU markets and
to boost rural development. With an equal emphasis on liberalisation, the EU is
keen to liberalise fisheries markets and to sign bi-lateral Free Trade Agreements.
The EU is keen to see greater monitoring of fisheries stocks and marine biodi-
versity in the region. Lastly, to mitigate the depletion of underground water
stocks and increased salinity because of urban demand and intensive usage in
agriculture, in order to mitigate drought and to decrease the risk of conflict, the
EU has promoted better water management in the region.
These strategies have been met with mixed success. It is true that countries such
as Egypt have developed a longer-term energy strategy and put in place a legal
and regulatory framework that was relatively compatible with the EU’s objec-
tives.28 There has been good progress in modernising energy infrastructures and
developing renewable energy plans.29 Additionally, through the use of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Technical
Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument, the EU has been able to
increase its financial assistance to the region over the years (the ENPI amounts
to €12 billion for the period 2007-2013). Furthermore the EU was able to fore-
see – albeit only partially – some of the problems that underlay the “Arab Upris-
ings”. For example, it not only recognised the importance of youth unemploy-
ment,30 but it also referred to the risk of conflict that might derive from ill-
managed resources and acknowledged that there was a need to reduce the expo-
sure of relevant neighbours to volatile resource prices.31
However, the EU has failed to meet some of its objectives. For example, the EU
has not been able to conclusively tap into the Arab Gas Pipeline via Egypt. Fur-
ther still, only in 2010 did the EU begin meaningful dialogue with Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia over the integration of the Maghreb’s electricity networks
into the EU’s, even though this was one of the major aims of the 2003 Rome
protocol. In pushing for legal and regulatory reforms of energy markets in the
southern neighbourhood, the EU may have been able to push for greater fiscal
28. European Commission, “Egypt Country Strategy Paper”, (4 January 2007), p. 13. See: http://
ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_egypt_en.pdf. (Accessed 10 November 2011).
29. European Commission, “Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 – Progress
Country Report: Egypt”, SEC(2011) 647, Brussels (25 May 2011). See: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/progress2011/sec_11_647_en.pdf. (Accessed 13 November 2011).
30. European Commission, “Communication on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”,
COM(2006) 726 final, Brussels (4 December 2006), p. 2.
31. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “National Indicative Programme 2007-2013,
Algeria”, p.12. See: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_algeria_en.pdf. (Accessed 15
November 2011).
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responsibility and redistributive revenue policies in these countries32 but it did
not do so. Additionally, the EU was, much like the rest of the world, taken by
surprise when the combination of increased consumer demand for food from
Asia, food crop diversion toward biofuels, poor harvests and increased specula-
tion on agricultural markets conspired to sharply raise food prices at the end of
2010 and beginning of 2011.33
The EU’s Reaction to Transition: Hysteresis or Headway?
Keen to respond to some of the aforementioned issues the EU’s initial response
to the political upheavals was to issue a revised ENP on 25 May 2011. The
review again mentioned natural resources and specifically acknowledged the
problems associated with rising food and energy prices, as well as speaking of
agricultural and rural development, environmental protection, resource effi-
ciency and energy security.34 It even repeats calls for renewable energy usage
when referring to the Mediterranean Solar Plan of the Union of the Mediterra-
nean, and the review sees a role over the medium-term for the Energy Commu-
nity Treaty – or a variant of it – which would increase energy policy dialogue for
regulatory frameworks and energy efficiency.35 Furthermore, in a Communica-
tion from the High Representative on 8 March 2011, the need to rapidly con-
clude trade liberalisation agreements on fisheries and agriculture was under-
lined.36
However, there have been some mixed messages with regard to the actions of
member states in the ongoing transitional phase. On the one hand, there have
been efforts under France’s G20 presidency – supported by the Commission37 –
to put in place an action plan to manage food price volatility through greater
regulation and supervision of agricultural financial markets. To this end, the
G20 have established the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) at
32. For the importance of institutions in managing resource stocks in the MENA region see: T.M. Yousef,
“Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 91-116.
33. See: C.B. Barrett & M.F. Bellemare, “Why Food Price Volatility Doesn’t Matter”, Foreign Affairs, (12
July 2011). There is an ongoing debate as to whether it is high prices or price volatility which is the cause
of the food price challenge. For example, compare Barrett and Bellemare’s article with H. Khoras, “Mak-
ing Sense of Food Price Volatility”, Brookings Institute, (3 March 2011).
34. European Commission, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of the European
Neighbourhood Policy”, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, (Brussels, 25 May 2011), p. 7.
35. Ibid., p. 10.
36. European Commission “A Partnership For Democracy And Shared Prosperity With The Southern
Mediterranean”, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels (8 March 2011).
37. European Commission, “Tackling the Challenges of Commodity Markets and Raw Materials”,
COM(2011) 25 final, Brussels (2 February 2011).
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the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to monitor food inventories
and prices, and the Global Agricultural Geo-monitoring Initiative in Geneva for
early warning of natural disasters. The G20 have also pledged greater assistance
to increase production levels in developing countries. The Final Communiqué of
the 2011 G20 Cannes Summit alludes to price volatility in energy markets,
marine protection from energy spillages and the need for increased renewable
energy usage.38 However, in the face of US and Brazilian reluctance to decrease
biofuels production, an incomplete Doha Round, the overshadowing of the
2011 Cannes Summit by the eurozone crisis and no specific figures on assistance
however the G20 has been less successful.
On the other hand, questions were raised about the intentions underlying the
“Friends of Libya” conference in Paris on 21 September 2011. It was believed
by many39 that the conference served as a means for EU member states to secure
lucrative oil contracts with Libya, with France and the United Kingdom in an
obviously strong position. What was of major concern about the member states’
bi-lateral approach to Libyan energy stocks was the absence of the EU. Indeed,
the EU’s High Representative played a minimal role at the conference and was
relegated behind leaders such as Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron. Yet, the
transition in Libya would have been a good opportunity to push forward the
EU’s long-standing plans for a Euro-Mediterranean energy market. Instead
member states took the lead and the EU was pushed into thinking only about
humanitarian considerations such as aid delivery.
Beyond Libya, however, there are some other long-standing problems which the
ENP has often neglected to fully take onboard. While there is poor agricultural
infrastructure and low investment in the farming sectors of MENA countries,
for example, the Common Agricultural Policy’s export subsidies ensure that
some of the EU’s market prices are higher than world levels40 which effectively
prices products from the southern neighbourhood out of EU markets.41 Further-
more, while the EU is now engaged in the much needed reform of the Common
38. G20, “Cannes Summit Final Declaration”, (4 November 2011). See: http://www.g20.org/
Documents2011/11/Cannes%20Declaration%204%20November%202011.pdf. (Accessed 20 November
2011).
39. One notable report in the French daily newspaper Libération claimed to have obtained a secret docu-
ment outlining the Libyan Transitional National Council’s intention to award France a 35% stake in Lib-
yan crude oil. See: http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012357324-petrole-l-accord-secret-entre-le-cnt-et-
la-france. (Accessed 24 November 2011).
40. A. Matthews, “Post-2013 EU Common Agricultural Policy, Trade and Development: A Review of
Legislative Proposals”, ICTSD, Issue Paper No. 39 (Oct., 2011), p. 26.
41. M. Halderman & M. Nelson, “EU Policy-Making: Reform of the CAP and EU Trade in Beef and
Dairy with Developing Countries”, PPLPI Working Paper No. 18, (January 2005). See also: H. Klavert,
P. Engel & E. Koeb, “Still a Thorn in the Side? The Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy from the
Perspective of Policy Coherence for Development”, ECDPM Discussion Paper, No. 126 (September
2011).
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Fisheries Policy, the environmental damage caused by overfishing has affected
the common fish stocks of the Mediterranean. The EU’s subsidisation of large
European fleets places strain on smaller and artisanal fleets in the southern
neighbourhood. Both the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies make it harder
for producers in the southern neighbourhood to meet local and global food
demands and to therefore assist in price stability.
The reaction to the “Arab Uprisings” has brought about no radical change in
thinking or policy on resources from the EU. This can be seen as both positive
and negative. Positive in the sense that the EU continues to recognise the major
resource challenges it faces vis-à-vis its southern neighbourhood. Negative
because the EU continues to be hampered by the individual foreign policies and
interests of its member states, and stymied by a low level of cooperation with
the United States and the BRICS in achieving a global resources deal through the
G20.
Building a Resource Secure Neighbourhood
If the ENP is to be more effective in its southern neighbourhood, and the EU is
to assist in the transitions being witnessed, the EU will have to de-compartmen-
talise the panoply of its political and economic tools and take a number of bold
steps. The first such step is the most difficult.
Given the macroeconomic nature of natural resource prices, the EU is under-
standably unable to deal with governance of volatility and hikes alone. Yet it can
lead efforts. The EU has recognised the need for greater transparency between
financial and physical markets of raw materials42 but more multilateral surveil-
lance is required. The EU should support the FAO – both politically and finan-
cially – with the development of AMIS. The system is potentially an important
international mechanism that will provide reliable natural resource data (e.g. on
national inventories) and will measure prices in both physical and financial mar-
kets in order to increase certainty in commodity markets. Yet it is sorely under-
funded. The EU should concentrate on re-igniting the Doha Round on trade, as
this would be a good way of reducing export bans on key resources during high
price periods.
Secondly, the EU needs to link natural resources and conflict more comprehen-
sively. While it is true that the EU does recognise the connection between conflict
42. Op.Cit., “Tackling the Challenges of Commodity Markets and Raw Materials”, p. 20.
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and resources,43 and between climate change and international security,44 the
revised ENP underplays the importance of these linkages. But with growing
populations, scarce resources and climate change, civil unrest and/or conflict are
more likely to occur on the EU’s southern borders. Take, for example, the ten-
sions created between Egypt and its neighbours over access to and usage of the
River Nile. For such instances the EU needs to boost its early warning and pre-
vention capabilities: early warning can be achieved not just through the use of
satellite imagery but also contact with locally effected communities; prevention
can occur through the provision of expertise to effected countries and/or regions
to work with local authorities to build up robust and equitable land and water
management mechanisms.
Lastly, the EU should make as a priority the conclusion of a Euro-Med Energy
Community. But such a community should harness the renewable energy poten-
tial of the MENA region. Renewable energies are cleaner, meeting the EU’s envi-
ronmental and climate change objectives, and they can play a role in creating
jobs and lowering resource insecurity. Developing such an energy community
would assist the EU with its resource-efficient flagship initiative under the
Europe 2020 Strategy to ‘reduce inputs, minimise waste, improve management
of resource stocks, change consumption patterns, optimise production proc-
esses, management and business methods, and improve logistics’.45 A good
point of departure would be the European Economic and Social Committee’s
call for a “New Green Deal” for the Mediterranean region.46 As part of such a
deal, the EU should put more pressure on the new governments in the MENA
region to devise equitable distribution of resource revenues in these countries.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how on paper the EU recognises the scale and scope of
what it is needed in terms of its resource policies in its southern neighbourhood.
Yet the chapter has flagged the impact of member states’ individual policies in
43. European Council, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”, S407/08,
Brussels (11 December 2008). See: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_
EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf. (Accessed 21 November 2011).
44. European Council, “Climate Change and International Security”, S113/08, Brussels (14 March
2008). See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf.
(Accessed 20 November 2011).
45. European Commission, “A Resource-Efficient Europe – Flagship Initiative under the Europe 2020
Strategy”, COM(2011) 21, Brussels (26 January 2011), p. 2.
46. European Economic and Social Committee, “The Promotion of Renewable Energies and the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Region”, Brussels (21 September
2011), p. 1. See: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.rex-opinions.18287. (Accessed 22 November
2011).
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the region, the effect of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies and the lack
of meaningful global governance as some of the serious impediments to an effec-
tive ENP. Multilateral solutions will be required for global resource security, but
the EU should lead the implementation of a sustainable resource plan in its
neighbourhood. A unified approach to resource policy, without just the tradi-
tional bias for energy, will not only promote supply security, and environmental
safety but also – in a period of as yet incomplete political transitions – assist in
the socio-economic development of the region. The EU should do this not only
out of goodwill, but because a resource secure neighbourhood is in its strategic
interest.
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ARAB SPRING AND MIGRATION: WILL THE NEW GLOBAL 
APPROACH TO MIGRATION AND MOBILITY RESPOND TO 
THE CHALLENGES?
YVES PASCOUAU
The EU’s responses to the Arab Spring in terms of mobility and migration has
been multifaceted. The first reaction was to provide immediate support to third
countries dealing with hundreds of thousands of people moving across the Med-
iterranean region and more particularly fleeing Libyan political unrest. The sec-
ond reaction was to publish a series of communications on ‘migration’ all out-
lining the need to develop new partnerships with countries of the Southern
neighbourhood in the field of migration.47 The third reaction was to ask the
modification of Schengen rules in order to allow member states to reintroduce
internal border checks in cases in which a partner faces a massive influx of
migrants at its external borders, putting therefore under high strain the entire
“Schengen edifice”. The March and June European Councils endorsed these
actions and proposals.
A few months after democratic uprising and subsequent declarations and
projects, it is time to try to have a more “distant” look on the issue. More pre-
cisely, it is time to evaluate whether and how the Arab Spring has modified the
external dimension of the EU in the field of migration. It occurred at a time
when an assessment and revision of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM)
– i.e. the EU’s external policy in the field of migration – were underway. In this
regard, the Arab Spring came at a very timely moment. It brought the Southern
dimension into the debate but in a different way than previously, as it obliged
EU decision-makers to think about relations with Arab countries through differ-
ent lenses. While relations had been developed with authoritarian regimes,
futures ones would involve new types of leaders with new set of aspirations. In
the same vein, people from the region are entitled to foresee their future within
the region and outside of it in a radically different way. The Southern dimension
became more meaningful.
The Commission initiated a consultation process with various stakeholders
which lasted throughout 2011 and concluded with the publication of a Commu-
47. European Commission, On Migration, COM(2011) 248, Brussels: 4 May. European Commission, A
Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries, COM(2011)
292, Brussels: 24 May. European Commission and High Representative for the European Union on For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2011)303, Brussels: 25 May.
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nication entitled the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).
The Communication takes stock of what has been achieved so far and adapts it
in order to respond to forthcoming challenges in a changing environment. While
the renewed global approach is broader than the previous one in different fields,
it is questionable whether this new framework will reach the objective in terms
of enhanced mobility for people living in the Arab Region.
A Broader Framework
At the beginning of EU migration policy in the early 2000s, the external dimen-
sion was mainly based on the conclusion of readmission agreements with third
countries. However, this orientation proved to be unsuccessful. In 2005, the
dramatic events that occurred in Ceuta and Melilla, when several migrants try-
ing to cross the Moroccan/Spanish border died, highlighted the limits of this
‘one way’ policy and imposed a redefinition of the EU’s external policy. The
ensuing ‘Global Approach to Migration’ (GAM) was agreed by the European
Council in December 2005. In a few words, the GAM aimed at including legal
migration opportunities in the dialogue with third countries as a counterpart to
their commitment in managing irregular migration and in concluding readmis-
sion agreements. Despite the openness of the approach, the results achieved five
years later were limited. The main instrument developed in this framework –
mobility partnerships – is non-binding, is based on the volunteering from the
member states, and provides too little for third countries in terms of incentives
in the field of legal migration. As a consequence, very few mobility partnerships
have been agreed and none with the countries from the Mediterranean region.
Hence, an evaluation of the GAM was necessary and led to the definition of a
new framework called Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM),
which improves and enlarges the former GAM.
The first most visible broadening of the concept comes from the title of the
communication which now includes the word ‘mobility’. For the Commission
‘mobility’ is a different and ‘much broader concept than migration’. It regards a
specific type of migration which involves a wide range of people (short term
visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family mem-
bers) but who are coming mainly for temporary reasons and who need a visa for
crossing the EU’s external borders. Hence, the Commission emphasises the need
to link the EU’s short term visa policy with the member states’ long stay policies
and the GAM. In other words, the GAMM should be more coherent and encom-
pass EU and national policies on visa and legal migration (which are beyond the
Commission’s competences) which concern several million people every year.
With this extension, the Commission seeks to reinforce the coherence of the
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Global approach and offers a full range of issues to fuel the dialogue with third
countries, including the opportunity for people to benefit from enhanced mobil-
ity.
The second major improvement concerns the introduction of international pro-
tection for asylum seekers, refugees and people in need of subsidiary protection
as a pillar of the GAMM. The Commission explains this novelty through the
need to give higher visibility to the EU’s external dimension of asylum vis-a-vis
its partners. Yet it should be recalled that third countries are taking a huge
responsibility in the management of international protection. In the case of the
Arab Spring, and according to the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM), about 345,000 fled Libya heading to Tunisia and 243,000 to Egypt.
Therefore, enhancing solidarity with third countries in the field of international
protection is crucial and the introduction of this theme within the Global
approach could help to strengthen EU assistance and third countries’ capacities
in processing asylum claims. This could be done through the further develop-
ment of regional protection programmes and resettlement programmes.
Finally, the GAMM addresses in a deeper way some crucial issues related to
migration. This is the case for instance regarding students and researchers. Dif-
ferent solutions are envisaged by the Commission in the short and medium term
such as enhanced exchanges, the establishment of institutional networks and the
twinning of universities in order to adapt curricula and certification processes
or the possibility for foreign students to have access to work at the end of their
studies. In this view, the European Commission has already announced in Sep-
tember 2011 that it will significantly increase the funding allocated to Erasmus
Mundus. For the new academic year, the Commission has decided to award 750
additional scholarships to students from North Africa and the Middle East in
addition to the 1200 already planned. The support should be strengthened after-
wards in order to provide new opportunities to undergraduate, postgraduate,
and doctoral students as well as staff coming from Southern Mediterranean
countries.
Among other issues, two deserve to be highlighted as they are linked with mobil-
ity. The question related to the portability of social security rights is the first one,
as it is considered as a facilitator for mobility and circular migration. The ques-
tion related to inter and intra regional migration and mobility in others parts of
the world is the second one. Here the EU has an important role to play in order
to assist third countries to develop such kind of schemes which could be to the
benefit of the migrant in terms of jobs and wages opportunities. Hence, dialogue
with third countries should also tackle this point and one can consider that rais-
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ing the issue of mobility within the Mediterranean region could be on the
agenda.
The new framework within which the external dimension of EU migration and
asylum policies should take place is definitely broader. While it takes into
account many developments that took place within the last five years, it also
places the issue in a wider and forward looking context. This promising four
pillar framework comprising legal migration and mobility, the fight against
irregular migration, international protection and development issues will form
the basis of the new dialogue that will be developed between the EU and third
countries from the Southern Mediterranean region. However, it remains uncer-
tain whether the ambitious framework proposed by the Commission will reach
its broad and valuable objectives. Indeed, when looking more closely at the
GAMM, it fails to fully convince as it may replicate former fallacies and there-
fore raise questions regarding its capacity to bring added value.
Too Little Added Value?
When looking more closely to the GAMM, it appears less promising than ini-
tially thought, especially on the side of mobility. On the one hand, the capacity
for the EU to provide for a real and comprehensive external policy is limited
principally because the main leverages and powers remain into the hands of the
member states. On the other hand, it is presently difficult to determine how the
existing tools will be implemented and more precisely used to increase pressure
on third countries to provide results in managing migration, such as controlling
irregular migration and borders and signing and implementing readmission
agreements. In the end, the potential to create a renewed external policy in the
field of migration between the EU, its member states and Arab countries may be
undermined.
This concerns first of all the tool at disposal. Due to constraints regarding com-
petences, the only available tool to deal with the Southern Mediterranean coun-
tries is mobility partnerships. Indeed, and due to division of competences
between the EU – which manages shorts stay visa and readmission – and the
Member States – still in charge of legal migration – the only binding instrument
that could be adopted would be a mixed agreement. But, such an agreement
would take years to be adopted and implemented. Hence, and in order to speed
up the process, non-binding ‘mobility partnerships’ are the only instrument
available. But, while offering flexibility, these partnerships present at least two
disadvantages. First of all they remain based on the principle of volunteering.
This means that only some member states will engage into the conclusion of a
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partnership and most probably those at the Southern edge of the EU. In this
context, and considering the links that exist between Arab countries and some
member states, will the EU be able to develop a proper and comprehensive pol-
icy in the field of migration? Secondly, mobility partnerships are non-binding
tools. Hence, there are no legal constraints weighing on the shoulders of part-
ners. The latter are then entitled to fulfil their commitments or not without legal
sanctions. In this regard, will the EU member states engaged in a mobility
partnership deliver what they promised as a counterpart to third country actions
if they are not fully satisfied? This possibility should not be underestimated con-
sidering the pressure that is put on third countries regarding readmission and
irregular migration.
This leads to the second point of concern which relates to the new ‘more for
more’ principle. The Commission indicates that it implies ‘an element of condi-
tionality’. One may in turn say that the catchword ‘more for more’ is the expres-
sion of the principle of conditionality. In this regard, third countries’ citizens will
be offered legal channels to the EU member states as far as their governments
are providing for valuable input in preventing and reducing irregular migration.
The problem here is to evaluate where the ‘requirement cursor’ will be placed.
Will counterparts be delivered on the basis of results achieved or means devel-
oped? In the current climate of growing tensions across Europe on the debate
over migration issues, it is likely that the former will take precedence over the
latter.
Third, when it comes to the pillar devoted to legal migration and mobility, EU
action is limited due to the maintenance of competence at the national level. The
EU is able to exercise its external competence as far as it has exercised its com-
petence internally, i.e. where rules have been already adopted at EU level. Hence,
the EU will be able to provide for some input into the dialogue only regarding
short stay visas, students, researchers or highly qualified workers.
Even with regard to short stay visas, the EU’s input is limited in so far as the
cooperation with third countries remains at the level of visa facilitation agree-
ments. Here, an EU agreement may contain rules to facilitate the procedure but
the decision to issue a visa remains into the remit of national consulates. The
real added value on the EU’s side would be to offer a visa free regime to third
countries. But here again, and despite the EU nature of the domain, member
states still have important influence through the Council. This latter plays a
central role in the conclusion of international agreements. Indeed, and according
to the Treaty (article 218 TFEU) ‘the Council shall authorise the opening of
negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the signing of agreements
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and conclude them’. In other words, and through the Council, member states
are still key components in the process.
On the side of legal migration, the EU is likely to not go beyond what already
exists: students, researchers and highly skilled workers. The problem here is not
on the capacity to act but rather on the opportunity/effectiveness of further
cooperation. Skills’ shortages within the European Union concern more pre-
dominantly skilled and middle skilled workers and not highly skilled. In this
view, the EU will not be able to offer the appropriate counterpart as the compe-
tence to determine entry and residence for this type of workers remains a
national one. The EU’s input may here again be narrow and leave the biggest
part of the deal into the hands of the member states. According to those involved
and their willingness to offer legal ways of entry for workers, it is not sure
whether the GAMM will reach the threshold of coherence and effectiveness pur-
sued.
A final point deserves some comment. It concerns the uncertainty regarding the
possibility to link progress made in the field of migration with development
policies. In other words, the possibility to condition development support to
progress made in the field of cooperation in migration management. Such link-
age was made for the first time at the EU level in a Communication issued in
early May 2011. In this document the Commission was underlying that cooper-
ation with third countries ‘implies enhanced economic cooperation in order to
develop conditions for growth and employment in countries of origin, to
address the causes of irregular migration. Such cooperation should also build on
the principle of conditionality applied to migration issues in order to encourage
effective commitment by our partners in preventing irregular migration flows,
in managing their borders efficiently and in cooperating on the return and
readmission of irregular migrants’.48 The GAMM does not follow this path.
However, it may have opened the door in this regard by recognising the possi-
bility ‘to earmark development funding for migrant-related initiatives’. Further
use of funding will then need to be examined.
Conclusion
There are two ways to consider the new GAMM: the glass is half full or half
empty. The optimistic version would be to consider the fact that the external
dimension of the policy is broader and puts more ‘flesh on the bones’ for further
dialogue. The half empty perspective leads to consider that the Commission
48. European Commission, On Migration, COM(2011) 248, Brussels: 4 May.
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could have been more ambitious. More precisely regarding legal admission and
mobility. Indeed, forthcoming demographic shrinking will increase labour
shortages in the European labour market to which workers coming from Med-
iterranean countries could constitute an appropriate response. Therefore limit-
ing counterparts to visa issuance or highly skilled workers may not allow
addressing in the full and appropriate manner the issue. Moreover and broadly
speaking, one could also underline that using ‘old tools’ – or even revised ones
– to cope with new situations in the Mediterranean region is not appropriate.
But was the Commission in a position to issue an ambitious communication?
Probably not because its orientations have to be endorsed by member states, on
the one hand, and respect the division of competences between the EU and mem-
ber states, on the other hand.
Future developments will be crucial. The outcome of the electoral processes in
North Africa and the Middle East will determine the EU’s counterpart for dia-
logue on migration issues, including the content of such dialogue and the feasi-
bility of the proposals on the table so far. On the side of the EU and its member
states secondly, both will have to deliver and provide for results. If and when
third countries can provide what the EU is expecting from them, the EU should
in turn be able to deliver rapidly and according to the efforts made by third
countries, in particular regarding the issuance of short stay visas and legal
admission. The implementation of the GAMM will demonstrate whether fur-
ther dialogue will prove efficient or not.
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THE ARAB SPRING: WHERE DO THE ARAB MILITARIES 
STAND AND WHY?
ROUBA AL-FATTAL EECKELAERT
On 14 January 2011, the Arab world witnessed the blossoming of a long
awaited revolution that took everyone, including authoritarian regimes, by sur-
prise. Since then, the militaries of the Arab states involved have played an active
and decisive role in determining the outcomes – and even the process – of these
revolutions.
In fact, the reaction of the military to the uprising is a watershed moment
between the popular demands for reform and the calls for an outright regime
change. It was President Kennedy who once remarked, “Those who make peace-
ful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable”, a statement
very applicable to Arab revolutions.
As each Arab country has its unique historical, structural (politico-economic),
and crucially ideological specificities, their respective militaries as well as the
relations that exist between the military and their regimes are bound by these
differences. These specificities have resulted in diverging responses to the popu-
lar uprisings and are worth understanding because what the military does (or
doesn’t do) during these turning points in the Arab world will be crucial in influ-
encing the countries’ political trajectory.
The main question being answered here is why did some Arab militaries defect
so quickly and side with the revolutionaries while others have not? Such an
analysis is not only theoretically interesting, but of consequence to real world
developments in democracy promotion. Indeed, we need to have a more
nuanced appreciation of the ways in which the underpinning ideologies of these
militaries work precisely because, at present, there is a transatlantic community
dialogue taking place regarding supporting emerging democracies in the Arab
world and also concerning how to engage the Arab militaries in this transition.
But before we can analyse the reactions of the Arab militaries to the Arab Spring
and derive their posture vis-à-vis incumbent authoritarian regimes, we first need
to understand what kind of actors the Arab armies actually are. Thus, the fol-
lowing comparison highlights the main historical, structural and ideological
aspects of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Yemeni, Libyan, Bahraini and Syrian mili-
taries, and how these three factors influenced the actions of each of their respec-
tive militaries towards the revolution.
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Tunisia
The Tunisian army was established at the time of independence in 1956, and has
been recognized for its contribution to UN peacekeeping missions, especially in
Rwanda. By 2008, the military consisted of approximately 36,000 personnel
across the Army, Navy, and Air Force – accounting for 0.3% of the total popu-
lation of 10.4 million and 1.4% of the country’s GDP.
During the Jasmine revolution, the army was ordered to turn their guns on pro-
testers, but refused. General Rachid Ammar spoke to demonstrators in Tunis
who were determined to bring down the interim government, still dominated by
Ben Ali’s political allies. “Our revolution is your revolution. The revolution of
the youth could be lost and exploited by those who call for a vacuum. The army
will protect the revolution,” he told the crowd. General Ammar played a key
role in the country’s popular uprising. He refused to follow Ben Ali’s orders to
shoot at the protesters, forcing the President to flee the country; since then,
peaceful demonstrations have continued in the capital of Tunis.
Although the intervention by the armed forces defied the expectations of Arab
militaries, the fact that officers sided with the Tunisian people actually makes
perfect sense. The Tunisian military is not a large military, but has experience in
peacekeeping operations, worked with and was trained by Western forces.
Defense spending in Tunisia under Ben Ali was relatively low, reflecting not only
the fact that the country has few external or domestic threats, but also part of
the Ben Ali strategy to ensure that the armed forces could not threaten his rule.
Egypt
The modern Egyptian army was created in the 1830s, and during the twentieth
century has fought several wars (with Israel, Libya and Yemen). Moreover, some
units assisted the US in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm for the liberation of
Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The army consists of approximately 379,000
troops, in addition to 479,000 reservists for a total of 858,000 strong – account-
ing for 1.1% of the total population of 80 million. In 2009, the budget of the
military mounted to approximately 3.12% of GDP – receiving more than $5.8
billion in U.S. military aid in that year alone. President Hosni Mubarak has had
significant influence over the military structure since the late 1960s when he
became the Chief of Staff for the Egyptian Air Force.
Despite the long and close relationship that existed between Mubarak and the
military, he was left high-and-dry as the revolution progressed. It started with
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differences in political positions between Officers and Enlisted Men, but, even-
tually, the higher echelons also defected.
Some observers argue that two of the main reasons why the army was willing to
sacrifice Mubarak were: 1) to satisfy some of the demands of the revolutionaries
in order to pacify them, and 2) because of its anger at his son Gamal and his
colleagues, such as former – and recently convicted – IMF official Youssef
Boutros-Ghali, who were accruing significant power through the financializa-
tion of the economy and other policies that weaken the power of the army and
the more traditional national capitalist elite. This growing financial influence of
Mubarak’s family was also counterproductive to the higher military echelons
who, as economic tycoons within the country, did not want to share their prof-
its.
Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which took over the polit-
ical administration of Egypt after Mubarak was ousted in February, has made
great efforts to appear open and responsive, yet their operations and guiding
philosophy remain undefined as they are still not being transparent. Critics com-
plain that the ruling military council still hasn’t delivered on earlier promises to
abrogate the emergency law and to enact the laws prohibiting former members
of the Mubarak regime from standing in upcoming parliamentary elections.
Mistrust is running high in Egypt as people are growing suspicious that old-line
politicians and generals are not listening because their pockets are being lined
by powerful people with vested interests in the outcome. In fact, some Egyptian
analysts are wary that the army might broker deals with the Muslim Brother
party, giving them more power in Parliament in return for their silence on the
military’s financial dealings.
Yemen
Yemen has the second largest military force on the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi
Arabia, with approximately 400,000 active personnel and 450,000 reservists
for a total of 850,000 troops – accounting for 3.5% of the total population of
23.6 million. Yemen’s defense spending has historically been one of the govern-
ment’s largest expenditures as a result of the domestic security threats posed by
terrorism and tribal conflicts. The defense budget increased from around $540
million in 2001 to an estimated $2 billion in 2006, which represents about 6%
of the country’s GDP. The US has also poured millions of dollars into Yemen to
train the army against al-Qaeda.
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The military was founded in 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republic (North
Yemen) and The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen – for-
merly a socialist republic) united to form the Republic of Yemen under President
Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Although the Saleh family is entrenched in Yemen’s defense industry – with
many of the President’s sons, (half-)brothers and in-laws in commanding posi-
tions in the armed forces – defections to join the revolutionaries still took place.
Due to divided tribal loyalties, South-North Yemen conflicts, and religious ten-
sions between forces loyal to Saleh (a Zaidi Shia from North Yemen but not a
direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad) and those loyal to the Houthis (a
Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in North Yemen and are allegedly a direct
descendant of Prophet Muhammad), rifts within the army were inevitable.
On 20 March, after a major crack-down by the army against protesters, many
top military and civilian officials resigned their posts. One day later, General Ali
Mohsen, Saleh’s half-brother and former chief military advisor – who is also
close to the Salafist movement – defected. Mohsen pledged to protect the dem-
onstrators in Change Square, signaling the first major blow to the regime.
Mohsen is by far the most powerful figure in the Yemeni military and his
announcement opened the floodgates as many officers have now come out sup-
porting the revolution.
However, Mohsen’s break with the regime is frequently viewed with cynicism by
demonstrators and experts alike, who see this as a strategic move to set himself
up for a post-Saleh future; his announcement put him in a position to be the
leader of the military under the next government. This is something a number
of prominent Yemenis are watching closely because he commands so much loy-
alty within the army.
Although a truce has been struck between Yemeni forces loyal to embattled Pres-
ident Saleh and the opposition tribesmen, it remains very fragile, with clashes
often erupting and causing many civilian deaths and casualties on a daily basis.
Among these troubles, Yemen’s security forces have also been heavily deployed
in many southern cities amid fears that clashes between the army and al-Qaeda
fighters might spread to the strategic port city of Aden, making the situation in
Yemen and the role of the army crucial.
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Libya
The Libyan army was established in 1951, after the country gained its independ-
ence. The defense budget is estimated at 1.2% for 2008. Libyan total forces are
estimated at a little more than 40,000 – accounting for 0.5% of the total popu-
lation of 6.4 million. Though the Libyan army has a large amount of military
equipment at its disposal, the vast majority was bought from the Soviet Union
in the 1970s and 1980s and has largely become obsolete as a large portion
remains in storage and much of the remaining equipment has been sold to vari-
ous African countries.
The Libyan army is generally regarded as a small and weak force, poorly armed
and poorly trained. Keeping the army weak was part of Gaddafi’s long-term
strategy to eliminate the risk of a military coup, resembling the one that brought
him to power in 1969.
Since the revolution started, the Libyan army has suffered massive defections
and is barely surviving at 20% of its original fighting capacity. Gaddafi used
brutal police and mercenary forces (from some neighbouring African countries)
to violently suppress protests resulting in an armed uprising between pro-gov-
ernment and anti-government forces. Some from the army joined the rebels and
weapons depots were plundered by protesters, bringing the country to the brink
of a civil war.
The defection of some elements of the army to the side of the protesters in Beng-
hazi did not trouble the late Colonel. His security chiefs did not hesitate to call
for air strikes on their own rebellious barracks and citizens in the east of the
country, which is one of the reasons why NATO forces were called upon to
intervene. The Gaddafi government then has put the country’s army chief, Gen-
eral Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabil, under house arrest after his defection and for not
following through on orders to kill protesters. But later on he was reported to
return to the regime and announce a general pardon to army members who
defected to join the rebels and returned to the regime. On October 20, 2011 he
was reported killed in Sirte along with Gaddafi, marking an end of an era for
the Libyan military and old regime.
Bahrain
The military of Bahrain is a small but well equipped military consisting of
approximately 9,000 personnel – accounting for 0.8% of the total population
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of 1.2 million. The defense budget of Bahrain is high, at an estimate of 6.3%
GDP in 2004.
The Kingdom of Bahrain is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
founded in 1981, with five other Gulf monarchies. Bahrain, in conjunction with
its GCC partners, has moved to upgrade its defenses in response to the threat
posed by the Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf wars.
Bahrain houses the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. And in 2003,
George W. Bush designated the country as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S.
Since then, it has been granted over $100 million in U.S. Foreign Military Fund-
ing to pay for various high profile weapons systems.
The history of Bahrain is a turbulent one with several coup attempts and linger-
ing Shiite-Sunni tensions given that it is ruled by a Sunni Muslim royal family,
but two-thirds of the population are Shiite. Hence, it was not surprising that the
Arab revolution found its way to the country.
Reports surfaced during a crack-down on protests that army units had sur-
rounded, cut off electricity to, and searched room by room the Salmaniya med-
ical complex. The reports also included allegations of human rights violations
and instances of excessive use of force. So, what began as a peaceful movement
for democratization and constitutional reform in February gradually turned into
a full-fledged clash within a month.
By 14 March, troops from a number of Gulf states, including 1,000 troops from
Saudi Arabia and 500 police officers from UAE, arrived in Bahrain in response
to a request from King Hamad Al Khalifa. The GCC shield force did not directly
intervene but were primarily to be used for policing. Basically, their role was to
keep Bahraini forces free to crush the huge protest movement, which they
appear to have succeeded in doing – at least for the time being.
Syria
The Syrian army was founded in 1946 when the country gained its independ-
ence. Approximately 3.8% of the GDP is spent on the military, which has
around 500,000 personnel – accounting for 2.1% of the total population of
22.5 million.
For the past few years, Syria has reached out to Russia and Iran to obtain mod-
ern weapons that will further improve its combat capabilities. Although Russia’s
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foreign minister said his country’s sale of weapons to Syria won’t upset the bal-
ance of power in the Middle East, the U.S. and Israel oppose further arms sales
to Syria fearing the weapons could fall under the control of Hezbollah fighters
in Lebanon.
President Bashar Assad’s younger brother, Maher, controls the Presidential
Guard, the Republican Guard, and the Fourth Armoured Division – key units
that form the security backbone of the state, together with the Alawite-domi-
nated secret police Mukhabarat.
Senior Syrian army positions are carefully filled by loyal members of President
Assad’s Alawite minority; thus, reducing the prospect of military pressure on
him to stand aside if protests grow. Although some officers from the Sunni Mus-
lim majority have been promoted to senior ranks, Sunni influence has been
weakened, and Assad’s brother, Maher, controls key military units packed with
Alawite soldiers. This fact makes the fate of many senior Syrian military officers
closely tied to that of Assad.
The Syrian army has responded with an excessive use of force, killing thousands
of protesters since the beginning of the revolution. So far, there have been no
known high-level defections from the senior ranks of the army or other branches
of the security forces. There have, however, been credible reports of junior offic-
ers and enlisted men, largely drawn from the Sunni majority refusing to open
fire on protesters. Syrian soldiers who deserted have said they were forced to
commit atrocities.
Defections from within the army may be coming in a matter of time. Once there
is a very clear sign that the regime is getting close to the edge, the army will jump
ship to salvage their situation. At first protesters are pinning their hopes on Ali
Habib, the Defense Minister and a member of the minority Alawi sect to which
the Assad’s belong, and on Daoud Rajha, the Chief-of-Staff and a Greek Ortho-
dox Christian. Both men are considered pro-western and are professional sol-
diers. However, In August 2011, amid regional pressure on the current regime
to end bloodshed in the country, President Assad replaced Ali Habib (who was
on the EU’s travel ban and asset freeze list for Syrian officials) with Daoud Rajha
as the Defence Minister.
At this critical time, Daoud Rajha should be encouraged by the EU and the U.S.
– instead of being sanctioned – in order to induce divisions at the top in the
Syrian army. Analysts are expecting that the President will eventually be
replaced by a general or a small group of generals from the regular army, the one
part of the Syrian state relatively unsullied of the killings (since the elite fourth
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division, effectively commanded by Maher, is almost a separate entity). In fact,
the army remains the only institution that can play a role in a transitional period
since the Syrian National Council (SNC), which is the main opposition coali-
tion, is still plagued by internal divisions. However, until then, Syria’s security
organs will move quickly and ruthlessly to suppress even the slightest hint of
revolt within the military.
Lessons Learned so Far?
Long gone is the belief that Arab militaries are the same, that every Arab mili-
tary is unconditionally the “backbone” or “guarantor” of Arab regimes, and
that these militaries will inevitably crack-down on protesters to protect the lead-
ers. The above six cases – where revolutions have recently taken hold – high-
lighted the major historical, structural and ideological differences between the
militaries of these countries.
It became clearer that where there are: 1) deep sectarian cleavages, and 2) where
the minority sector is in power, members of the military have not defected from
the regime. This is because, in these places, the high military ranks are usually
packed with officers from the minority sect in power whose survival depends on
its solidarity with the military – a fact that ends up curtailing the process of the
revolution.
In the Syrian case, 13% are Shia which includes the Alawite ruling sect; while in
Bahrain, the Shia constitute over 70% of the Muslim population, yet the King-
dom is ruled by a Sunni minority. In both cases the military, as a whole, did not
defect and acted severely in its crack-down on protesters.
By contrast, in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the overwhelming majority are Sunni
Muslim and the ruling parties – along with the high echelons of the military –
are also Sunni. In these three cases, the military defected rather quickly and
sided with the protesters since other non-ideological factors (mainly politico-
economic) played a bigger role in their decision.
The case of Yemen remains the most complex one. This can be attributed to the
fact that the sectarian divide is not as sharp as in other cases (with 52% of the
Muslim population is Sunni and 46% is Zaydi-Shia). Also, although President
Saleh is a Zaydi-Shia, he does not really represent the Shiite minority of the
country, because he is a “non-Hashimi” Zaydi (meaning he is not a direct
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad). Hence, he is not considered eligible to
rule under the Zaydi Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen rules of succession.
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This combination of factors have attributed to the fuzziness of the reaction of
the Yemeni army during this revolution, with some defections that can be better
characterized as a shifting of tribal loyalties.
What does this mean for democracy support and transatlantic dialogue? It
means that the military plays an essential role in the transition to democracy in
the Arab world, especially where we see confessional armies at play. Hence, it
should be well understood and included in the democracy promotion schemes
of the transatlantic community. However, the fact that these militaries are dif-
ferent in their history, structures and ideologies, makes any prospect of a
straightforward co-operation a rather challenging prospect. One thing that is
becoming more certain, Arab militaries are indeed rational and self-interested
actors; therefore, they will act as agents of democratisation insofar as the bal-
ance between their costs and benefits works to their advantages.
A historical reading of Western involvement with external militaries teaches us
to be vigilant on two counts. First, today’s friends are perhaps tomorrow’s ene-
mies. Therefore, a strategy of arming the rebels in the Arab world during these
revolutions may actually backfire in the future. Second, as President Reagan
once said: “No arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formi-
dable as the will and moral courage of free men and women”. Hence, the trans-
atlantic community needs to think carefully about their course of action today
in order to avoid standing alone on the wrong side of history.
Table 1: An Overview of the Arab Military in the Revolting Arab States
Country
Population 
in million
Year military 
Founded
Total # of 
Troops
% of the 
Population
Budget as % 
of GDP
Tunisia 10.4 1956 36,000 0.3 1.4
Egypt 80 1830 858,000 1.1 3.12
Yemen 23.6 1990 850,000 3.5 6
Libya 6.4 1951 40,000 0.5 1.2
Bahrain 1.2 1982 9,000 0.8 6.3
Syria 22.5 1946 500,000 2.1 3.8
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MEDITERRANEAN MAYHEM: LESSONS FOR EUROPEAN 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
SVEN BISCOP
The crisis in Libya was a textbook example of a situation in which Europe,
through the European Union, should have taken the lead and proved that it is a
security actor worth noting. Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the
use of force, the most difficult precondition for intervention to fulfil; regional
support in the form of an unprecedented request for intervention from the Arab
League; absolute clarity in the US that it preferred not to take the lead. What
more boxes needed to be ticked before the EU could step onto the breach and
take charge of crisis management?
Alas, if all external conditions were fulfilled, the vital internal condition was
missing: European unity. Luckily for Europe, and for the cause of freedom in
Libya, France and the UK took the lead and with US support raised a broad
coalition of North American, European and Arab countries that started military
operations, with the participation of EU Member States Belgium, Denmark,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. But with Italy initially most reluctant
to let go of its very own special relationship with the Gaddafi regime, with Ger-
many in New York abstaining on UNSC 1973, and with a number of Member
States maintaining complete radio silence, it proved impossible for the EU as
such to contribute to the military operations, let alone to take the lead through
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
As a result, the EU remained nearly absent from the scene, in spite of strongly
worded initial statements from the European Council and the Foreign Affairs
Council requiring Gaddafi to relinquish power. The conduct of the military
operations was entrusted to NATO, and their political direction to the coalition
of the willing. Diplomatic efforts at mediation, limited as they are, were in the
hands of the United Nations and the African Union. The Union thus not only
was unable to engage in crisis management, but abdicated the political leader-
ship as well.
Fortunately, thanks to French and British leadership, action was taken. But it is
a shame that it could not be done through the EU. First, the operation did serve
the interests of all twenty-seven EU Member States: no EU capital mourned the
demise of Gaddafi and his regime. Furthermore, as was inevitable from the
beginning, the issue has now ended up on the EU agenda anyway, when the
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long-term perspectives for the country and the region are at stake. The EU can
yet benefit from the Libyan crisis, if it learns some key strategic lessons.
Standing up for Europe’s Vital Interests
That vital European interests are at stake in the Mediterranean behoves no fur-
ther explanation. Trade routes, energy supply, migration are but the most evi-
dent. The Libyan crisis has demonstrated once more what we knew already:
nobody will automatically volunteer to protect our vital interests for us. Just like
at the start of the Yugoslav conflict in the early 1990s, the US signalled that it
was willing to contribute, politically and military, but not to take the lead. And
rightfully so, for this concerned Brussels much more than Washington.
After the start of the operations, outgoing US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates
amplified that message in his farewell speech in Brussels on 10 June 2011, in
which he clearly warned Europeans that in the future Washington expects them
to be capable of dealing with crises in their neighbourhood by themselves. Veiled
threats of American disengagement from European security are a customary
way of putting pressure on Europeans to step up their defence effort. Europeans
know of course that the US can only allow itself to turn away from Europe and
look towards Asia as long as Europe is secure – if the security of Europe were
severely threatened, its vital interests would compel the US to intervene. In that
sense, the US remains a European power. Yet, this time around the demand for
more burden-sharing is more urgent and more sincere, because of the huge cuts
in the defence budget that the US is facing.
EU capitals will hopefully realize that more leadership and effort is expected
from the EU therefore, at the very least in what it has dubbed its Neighbour-
hood.
Thinking and Acting Strategically
Defending our vital interests requires strategy. The first strategic choice is to
prioritize the regions where those interests are most directly at stake, and act
accordingly. This would amount to a specific Crisis Management Strategy.
The Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood definitely counts among those prior-
ities. So do Central Asia and the Gulf, and maritime security from Suez to
Shanghai and in the future probably in the Arctic, in view of the interests at
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stake. Sub-Sahara Africa can probably be added, given the continued need for
external help with peace support. Another priority is assisting the UN in main-
taining collective security, notably to uphold the Responsibility to Protect that
has found its first application in Libya. Moral responsibility and defending our
interests thus often coincide.
Three factors explain Europe’s reluctance, erroneously, to think in strategic
terms about priority regions.
First, strategy is too much identified with the military. The aim is not to deline-
ate a sphere of influence in which gunboat diplomacy will uphold Europe’s
interests. Rather the idea is to identify regions where our vital interests are most
likely to be challenged in order to provide a focus for a long-term strategy of
prevention, which in a holistic and multilateral manner puts to use all instru-
ments of external action, in partnership with local and regional actors, to create
long-term stability. But we must be aware that, as a last resort, precisely because
these are priority regions for our vital interests, we might be required to take
military action if no other means can work, and must organize monitoring and
early warning and do our permanent military planning accordingly.
Second, the military option is too narrowly identified with EU-only military
action. In fact, in crises demanding military action, depending on which partners
want to support us, it can be implemented through NATO, CSDP, the UN, or
an ad hoc coalition. Whichever is more likely to be effective in the case at hand.
But the framework for the command and control of the military operations is
but a technical matter. Any military intervention will be one part of a compre-
hensive strategy for the country and the region concerned, including a political,
economic and social next to the security dimension. Regardless of the option
chosen to command any military operation, as far as Europe is concerned the
foreign policy actor setting this comprehensive strategy will always have be the
EU, for it is only through the EU that we have the instruments and the means to
make our long-term policies towards these priority regions. It is at the EU-level
therefore that priorities for crisis management must be set. In Kosovo European
troops are deployed under NATO command; in Lebanon, under UN command;
but in both cases Europe’s comprehensive long-term political strategy for the
country is defined through the EU. So it ought to have been for Libya: up to the
EU, not to a coalition of the willing, to assume strategic control and political
direction of all actions, even though the military operations are under NATO
command, for eventually we review the Neighbourhood Policy and our specific
Libya policy at the EU level as well.
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Third, military action is wrongly identified with automatic participation by all
Member States. In fact, as the record of CSDP proves, exactly the opposite is
true. There is no expectation in the EU that all Member States take part in all
operations. But there is a justified expectation that those not seeking to partici-
pate in a particular operation under discussion do not block, but provide polit-
ical support to those proposing it, if it serves the vital interests of the EU and all
its Members. Thus in the case of Libya, especially as the EU did adopt strong
language calling for Gaddafi to leave, it could also have decided on implement-
ing UNSC 1973 through a CSDP operation, under French or British command,
without obliging all twenty-seven to take part. Unfortunately, the Council
merely decided on a CSDP operation to support the humanitarian efforts, but
only if requested by OCHA – a request which everybody in Brussels knew in
advance was never going to materialize. “EUFOR Libya” thus only served to
underscore the irrelevance of the EU in this crisis, while spending not insignifi-
cants sums on activating an operational headquarters.
Adopting a Crisis Management Strategy, as one of the sub-strategies to the over-
all European Security Strategy, would not in itself be a guarantee of the political
will to act. But it would hopefully create the framework within which in the next
crisis it will at least be more easy to generate the political will to mandate action
under the EU aegis, to be undertaken by the Member States that are able and
willing.
Getting the Right Capabilities
Acting strategically requires capabilities. In the military realm, European capa-
bilities remain deficient. The Libyan crisis hopefully can spur EU Member States
on to take action.
Taken together, the twenty-seven EU Member States are the world’s second big-
gest military actor, after the US. But those impressive overall numbers hide stra-
tegic shortfalls in key areas, which the operations in Libya have highlighted.
Precision-guided munitions (missiles), satellite observation, aircraft carriers, air-
to-air refuelling: for lack of sufficient European capacity, US support was wel-
come and most necessary. The coalition of the willing could have undertaken an
operation without the US, but it would have been much slower and, most
importantly, much dirtier and nastier, with a greatly increased risk of casualties
on our side and of civilian casualties in Libya: 90% of the strategic enablers that
allow for a “clean” air campaign were contributed by the US.
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Unfortunately, the political fallout of the Libyan crisis may negatively affect the
“Ghent Initiative” for enhanced capability development that is now being dis-
cussed. The emphasis is on pooling and sharing of capabilities and task special-
ization, in order to enhance cost-effectiveness and operational output, and to
create budgetary margin to address the strategic shortfalls. While it must be
noted that pooling can be organized in such a way that all participants retain
maximal flexibility to engage in separate operations, there is a big risk that
Member States will now not be willing to engage in pooling and sharing with
those seen as unlikely to join in when it comes to real operations. That impres-
sion can only be undone by those so accused, including by signalling their will-
ingness to pool capabilities in substantive capability areas, to a substantive
degree. That in turn will create the political energy necessary to ensure that the
“Ghent initiative” becomes a long-term process, in order to arrive eventually at
a forum for effective strategic-level dialogue between national defence planning.
Only through CSDP can such military convergence be achieved as the only way
to produce more deployable capabilities by all Member States, which will thus
also benefit the two military most powerful Member States, France and the UK.
While the degree to which Member States will engage in substantive pooling of
capabilities thus remains to be seen, nevertheless at the 1 December 2011 For-
eign Affairs Council Member States did already make important decisions con-
cerning the strategic shortfalls. In the fields of air-to-air refuelling and satellite
communications especially the projects announced, if follow-up is assured, will
be key in providing Europeans with some of the strategic enablers required for
autonomous operations.
Achieving Effective Prevention
One specific capability in which the EU is lacking is planning and conduct. The
EU does not have a permanent operational headquarters. As a result, it cannot
do permanent planning, so that whenever a contingency arises specific plans can
be produced quickly. And it cannot but outsource the conduct (command and
control) of an actual operation, either to a Member State or to NATO.
The Libyan crisis demonstrates though that the availability of NATO is not
guaranteed, even though in the end Turkish objections were overcome (though
in future crises they will undoubtedly re-emerge in view of Turkey’s new foreign
policy stance). The only EU Member States able to conduct such complex oper-
ations are France and the UK, and then only with difficulty. The inevitable con-
clusion is that if Europeans want to be sure they are able to act in every future
contingency, the EU needs its own operational HQ. Now is the opportunity to
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set up an integrated civilian-military OHQ within the European External Action
Service. Proposals to achieve this have been blocked however by the UK. All that
the Member States could agree on was the activation, for the first time, of the
small Operations Centre in the EU Military Staff for the new capacity-building
operation in the Horn of Africa. An important but for now mostly symbolic
step.
But even if a fully-fledged OHQ to command military operations is not feasible
for the time being, the EU should still take steps to reinforce its planning capac-
ity at one level above the OHQ: the military-strategic, or in the EU context,
civilian-military strategic level (comparable to the level of SHAPE in NATO,
which does not command any operations, but provides the link between the
various OHQs and the political headquarters in Evere). The Union advertises
itself as a great preventive actor, but in reality, effective prevention or early
action are rarely achieved. One of the key factors explaining this is the absence
of a sufficiently permanent planning capacity to elaborate policy options and
contingency plans based on the situation reports produced by the Situation Cen-
tre even before any political decision is taken. As a result, the EU cannot but
arrive late in the day. The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)
and the EUMS have the capacity to produce high-quality plans for operations
envisaged well in advance, such as for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. But they
lack the staff to produce contingency planning and options in (potential) crisis
situations, as soon as something starts brewing in a pre-identified priority
region. This has to take place before any political decision: it is exactly to lay
the groundwork for an informed political decision, which can then be imple-
mented more rapidly. The new Directorate General for Crisis Response until
now focuses more on quick reaction in terms of fact-finding and relief (and does
so very effectively).
At the 1 December 2011 Foreign Affairs Council, the CMPD and EUMS were
authorized to engage in more early advance planning, but it remains unclear
whether the number of planners will be increased. The Council also decided on
a review of crisis management procedures. Ideally, the CMPD will receive extra
staff, both military and civilian, and a broad and clear civilian-military mandate,
in order to engage in effective contingency planning for EU prevention and rapid
reaction making use of all the tools at the Union’s disposal.
Conclusion
Today, the picture is mixed. In Libya, European countries were in the lead, but
the EU was not. Now, the EU is coming back into the picture, for it is beyond
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the capacity of those individual EU Member States to set and implement long-
term strategy for Libya and the Mediterranean, grateful though one must be to
them for assuming leadership of the crisis management. If the strategic lessons
listed above are learned and absorbed, the next time hopefully the EU will be in
the picture from the very start, to the benefit of all concerned.
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THE ARAB SPRING AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 
A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF MUTUALLY REINFORCING 
NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS
MURIEL ASSEBURG
Protests, revolts and the fall of decades-old leaderships have brought about
political openings and the chance, at least in some Arab states, to embark on
paths that could lead to more open, more just and more participatory political
and economic systems. Yet, their repercussions with regard to peace in the Mid-
dle East, i.e. the implications for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, have
been less positive. Indeed, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has
become increasingly volatile and Israel has become ever more isolated in the
region since the beginning of 2011. Although the Arab Spring has been one
important factor in this, other developments, such as the frictions over recently
discovered natural gas in the Levantine basin and a more assertive Turkish for-
eign policy, have added to it. As a result, not only does violent escalation loom
large, the prospects of a two-state-approach to settle the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict are dim. Protracted conflict will, in turn, have repercussions for transfor-
mation in Arab countries, above all in those neighbouring Israel – even more so
should the struggle once more turn violent. It will also negatively affect Euro-
pean credibility and interests in the Arab world.
Already, Europeans and the US have missed the opportunity of the Palestinian
UN initiative to realise the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, define the
contours of a two-state settlement and create a more balanced starting point for
negotiations. Now, in face of the urgency of a two-state settlement and against
the backdrop of the US administration’s paralysis due to the US election cam-
paign, Europe needs to act. The E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom)
should take the initiative to move the Quartet process – re-launched in Septem-
ber 2011 – forward. In this, a mediation effort is needed that evens out, rather
than exacerbates the asymmetric relationship between the two parties. Europe-
ans should draw up the parameters of a conflict settlement (as already presented
in February 2011 in the Security Council) and a binding time table, establish an
oversight mechanism, get Quartet backing for it – and spell out the conse-
quences of the (probable) failure of a negotiated solution.
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Israel Loses its Partners in the Region
Due to the Arab Spring, Israel has lost further partners in the region and thus
finds itself increasingly isolated. As a result of the 2008/2009 Gaza War Israel’s
strategic alliance with Turkey had already come under strain. This has been
exacerbated by the May 2010 flotilla affair and the row over the September
2011 publication of the United Nations Palmer Commission report on the same
affair. Rather than leading to reconciliation, Israel still refused to apologise for
the deaths of nine Turkish activists. Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador, can-
celled military cooperation agreements with Israel and announced its intention
to increase its military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. This rather drastic
reaction has to be read not only against the backdrop of Turkey’s political and
economic interests in the Arab world but also in view of fierce competition over
exclusive economic zones in the eastern Mediterranean as well as the Cyprus
question. As a result, Israel has not just lost its only strategic partner in the
region, but also an alliance with an increasingly influential regional player.
Indeed, while Turkish-Israeli relations have become rather hostile, at least with
regards to the rhetoric, and in the process have produced stronger Israel-Greece-
Cyprus and Turkish-Arab cooperation, considerable room for repairing rela-
tions remains. As a matter of fact, Turkey has taken on responsibility for Israel’s
security by installing the central radar of NATO’s missile defense on its territory,
which is intended, above all, to protect Israel from Iranian missiles.
With the end of the Mubarak era in February 2011, Israel lost one of its most
important and reliable Arab partners. Since the formation of a transitional gov-
ernment in Cairo, relations have deteriorated. Deliveries of Egyptian gas to
Israel, which had covered some 40% of domestic demand, have been disrupted
time and again due to attacks on the Sinai pipeline. Egyptian political figures
announced that they intended to renegotiate cooperation agreements – particu-
larly with regards to Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) and gas deliveries.
Moreover, the military junta ruling the country bowed to public pressure and
distanced itself from previous Israeli-Egyptian cooperation on the blockade of
the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s May 2011 decision to open the Rafah Crossing signalled
a new policy here – in the end, however, Egypt loosened the blockade only
slightly rather than removing it effectively.
Even the weakening of the Asad regime by the Syrian revolt has proved prob-
lematic for Israel. True, both countries have formally been at war with each
other, Syria under Bashar al-Asad has deepened its alliance with Iran as well as
positioning itself as the leader of the “camp of resistance” against what is seen
as Israeli and American designs for the region, and it has supported militant
movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Yet, Syria has proved reliable when
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it comes to securing its border with Israel – which it has kept quiet for some 40
years (since the 1973 war). Indeed, over the last few years, Syria even cooper-
ated with Israel, insofar as it allowed exports into Syria from the occupied
Golan Heights. While the fall of the Asad regime could open the way for a more
open, participatory and inclusive political system as well as for a détente in
Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese relations, this is by no means guaranteed.
After all, it is rather unlikely that a new Syrian leadership would be any less
robust in its demands for the return of territory occupied by Israel. In addition,
in late November 2011, a gradual and peaceful transfer of power seems to be
rather unrealistic. Rather, confrontations between regime, defectors and protest-
ers are more and more developing into an armed power struggle and bear the
imminent danger of large-scale civil war and atrocities between ethnic and reli-
gious communities. Already today, Syria’s neighbours are affected by the vio-
lence in the form of refugees and cross-border violence. In the case of escalation
of communal violence, which also risks bringing further regional meddling and
proxy fighting, massive destabilising effects are to be expected – not only for
Israel but also for other neighbours, in particular Lebanon.
Popular Influence Increases and Decreases Arab Regimes’ 
Room for Manoeuvre
The Arab Spring has affected next to all Arab regimes forcing them to seek
renewed legitimacy. Against this background, the scope of action enjoyed by
Arab leaders has been considerably diminished. True, Arab protests and upris-
ings have first and foremost brought to the fore domestic political and socio-
economic grievances and demands. Burning Israeli and US flags has been at
most a side-show. Arabs turned out to be unwilling any longer to accept repres-
sion at home in the name of resistance or steadfastness against Israel. Yet there
has been no warm peace between Israel and any of its neighbours, and thus a
normalisation of relations between Arab societies and Israel has not taken place.
Indeed, the very notion of this kind of rapprochement is overwhelmingly
rejected by the Arabs as long as the Israeli occupation of Arab territories per-
sists. This is why a growing popular influence on regional relations is a particu-
lar problem for Israel. After all, more representative Arab governments will have
to legitimise their actions to public opinion rather than bending to external
actors such as the US or simply pandering to the ruling elite’s interests. In addi-
tion, those regimes that are not prepared to allow greater popular participation
in decision-making will still (or maybe even more strongly) avoid taking deeply
unpopular decisions.
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For that reason, no Arab government is going to push for any peace initiative
towards Israel’s right-wing government in the months to come. Also, none of
them will have an interest in positioning themselves on Israel’s side or being
perceived as doing so, e.g. by stepping in to prevent demonstrations and
marches on Israel’s borders should they occur. Rather, clashes between Palestin-
ians and Israeli border guards might serve as a welcome diversion from domestic
tensions for some neighouring regimes – as was already the case on the eve of
the Nakba anniversary on 5 June 2011 on the Syrian-Israeli border. Another
source of tension stems from the very fragile security situation in the Sinai which
has not only entailed repeated attacks on the gas pipeline but also serious cross-
border attacks on civilians and military personnel in Israel leading to the killing
of Egyptian border guards in August and again in November 2011. A crisis
erupted when the Israeli embassy in Cairo was stormed and besieged by a mob
in reaction to the August incident and its staff had to be evacuated – amidst
escalating rhetoric on both sides. Further attacks from the Sinai bear the danger
of violent escalation as well as of a further deterioration of Israeli-Egyptian rela-
tions and a dangerous dilution of Camp David arrangements. This remains true
even if bilateral relations relaxed temporarily in the context of the October 2011
Egyptian mediation of the Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange.
Israel Misses the Chance to Refashion its Relations with the 
Neighbours
The insecurity brought about by protests and upheavals in the region, the anti-
Israel rhetoric of Turkey’s Prime Minister, the strengthened influence of Hezbol-
lah in Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear programme, as well as the perceived rise of
Iranian influence in the region have reinforced the bunker mentality of Israel’s
right-wing government. The coalition under Prime Minister Benjamin Netan-
yahu has felt confirmed in its attitude that the time was by no means ripe for
peace overtures or “concessions,” even though parts of the Israeli Left, of the
opposition of the Centre (Kadima) and of the security establishment urged the
government to exert stronger efforts to reach a peace agreement with the Pales-
tinians and to positively approach the changing environment. Instead, the gov-
ernment has concentrated on building up its military advantage over its Arab
neighbours and Iran, on a diplomatic campaign to prevent recognition of Pales-
tine and its admission as a full member to the United Nations and on shifting
the debate towards the Iranian threat.
In the summer of 2011, the Israeli government was challenged domestically by
a countrywide protest movement. The protesters demanded social justice,
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affordable living space and fair costs of living – with Israel being the OECD
country with income gaps second only to the US. Even though young Israelis
were inspired by the Arab Spring, as their placards showed, only few of them
demanded their political leadership to work for a rapprochement with Israel’s
Arab neighbours. Also, very few of them made the link between Israel’s low
expenditure for education and social welfare on the one hand and the cost of
occupation and military strength on the other. In the end, the Israeli government
did not exert serious efforts to make use of the changing regional environment
to build new and better relations with the newly forming societies and systems.
Palestinian Power-Sharing Agreement and the Palestinian 
UN initiative
The Arab Spring brought renewed impetus to efforts to overcome internal Pal-
estinian division. In early May 2011, Hamas and Fatah, together with smaller
Palestinian factions, signed a power-sharing agreement, after years of earlier
talks and different mediators had failed to overcome the differences between the
main competitors. The deal reflected the realisation of the leaderships in Ram-
allah and Gaza City (or rather in Damascus) that the people of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip were no longer willing to accept their competing govern-
ments’ intransigence or the consolidation of two increasingly authoritarian sys-
tems. Unlike in other Arab states, Palestinian protests in mid-March 2011
focused not on the demand to overthrow the regime(s) but on overcoming inter-
nal divisions. This demand has also been consistently expressed in opinion polls
as one of the Palestinian priorities for years. Other factors linked to the Arab
Spring also had an effect on both movements’ considerations. After all, both saw
their regional supporters weakened or overturned: the Mubarak regime, the
main supporter of Fatah, had already been displaced; the Syrian regime,
Hamas’s principal sponsor, was wobbling, which necessitated a reorientation of
the Hamas leadership. In addition, an – at least temporarily – more independent,
more self-confident and more constructive Egyptian foreign policy, which did
not favour one Palestinian movement over the other let alone putting US-Amer-
ican or Israeli concerns first, allowed for the agreement to be sealed. Still, due to
the contradictory interests of Fatah and Hamas, implementation of the agree-
ment did not see progress until late 2011.
Another factor that had opened the way for the power-sharing agreement to be
concluded was the lack of progress in the peace process. No bilateral Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations had taken place since September 2010, when a tempo-
rary and partial settlement moratorium ran out. US President Barack Obama’s
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speeches on the Arab Spring and the Middle East delivered in May 2011 at the
State Department and at the AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee)
Conference were overwhelmingly welcomed in Israel as confirmation of the US
commitment to Israel and the strength of the Israeli-American friendship, as was
Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech before both Houses of Congress. For their part,
the Palestinians welcomed Obama’s insistence on a two-state settlement based
on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps. Yet, the Palestinian leadership also
interpreted the speeches as clear indications that they should not expect active,
consistent or balanced US mediation and that negotiations with the Netanyahu
government would lead nowhere. The Palestinian leadership therefore focused
its political efforts not on a renewal of negotiations but on mobilising interna-
tional support for full membership in the United Nations, thereby trying to
improve its international standing and internationalising the resolution of the
conflict. In this approach, the Palestinians were able to rely on widespread inter-
national empathy as well as recognition of its efforts in state- and institution-
building from international organisations. At the same time, it was clear from
early on that full membership was a way off, as the US had announced its inten-
tion to use its veto in the Security Council. In the end, while Palestine was wel-
comed by a large majority as a full member into UNESCO in early November
2011, it did not even muster the nine votes necessary in the Security Council to
pursue full UN membership.
Prospects and Conclusions for EU Policies
The prospects for conflict settlement are anything but good. To the contrary: the
mutual reinforcement of negative tendencies and the increased insecurity in the
region make a constructive approach to conflict resolution increasingly unlikely.
Following the failure to turn the Palestinian UN initiative into a constructive
step towards Palestinian self-determination, an end to Israeli occupation and a
peace agreement, there is a risk of heightened tensions and of a third intifada –
which might well have larger regional implications than the last Palestinian
uprisings. This danger is heightened even further due to the weakening of the
Palestinian Authority as a consequence of Israeli and US reactions to the Pales-
tinian move at the UN: the severe US reduction of financial support for the PA,
the Israeli withholding of tax and customs transfers to the PA, as well as a
renewed settlement drive. An option discussed ever more frequently among Pal-
estinians is to dissolve the Palestinian Authority, hand all responsibility for the
Palestinian territories back to the occupying power and concentrate the struggle
on achieving equal rights within the State of Israel rather than independence
from it. Such an approach, should it be pursued even against the strong interests
of Palestinian elites, would clearly mark the definitive end of the Oslo process.
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But it would most likely not see success – as Israel has no incentive to annex
those territories on which the better part of the Palestinian population live and
make them citizens – and it would certainly not help to solve the conflict.
The persistence of conflict, but even more its violent escalation, will be accom-
panied by all those elements that make the consolidation of more open and
participatory political systems in Israel’s neighbourhood less likely: oversized
armies and an allocation of resources that favours military and defence over
human development, a dissent-intolerant atmosphere, an unfavourable invest-
ment climate, a strengthening of radical forces and non-state armed groups and
the further weakening of states as well as the Palestinian Authority. It will also
negatively impact on Europe’s relations with states and peoples in the region as
long as Europeans do not follow up there stances with concrete and credible
engagement at conflict settlement.
Already, European attempts to dissuade the Palestinians from presenting their
initiative for full UN membership to the Security Council as well as (some) Euro-
pean countries’ voting on the Palestinian UNESCO membership bid and their
stance in the Security Council in November 2011 were in stark contrast to the
enthusiastic European support for other Arab peoples’ quest for freedom and
self-determination. They were also out of sync with the agreed European
approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict: Europeans have held that the con-
flict should be settled through a two-state arrangement for its Israeli-Palestinian
dimension, complemented by peace agreements between Israel and its Arab
neighbors (Syria and Lebanon) on the principle of land for peace as well as
peaceful, neighbourly relations between Israel and the wider Arab and Muslim
world – as spelt out in the Arab Peace Initiative. It is with this intention that,
since the beginning of the Oslo Process in 1993, the EU and its member states
have supported the building of a Palestinian state with considerable financial
and technical assistance. Accordingly, in March 1999, towards the end of the
interim period agreed in Oslo, the EU announced that it would consider recog-
nising a Palestinian state “in due course”, an intention reiterated in the EU
Council Conclusions of December 2009 and 2010. In spring 2011 the UN, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank all confirmed that Palestine
had fulfilled the preconditions for statehood – to the extent possible under con-
tinuing occupation. At the end of July the United Nations Special Coordinator
for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry, told the Security Council that
the Palestinian Authority was “ready to assume the responsibilities of statehood
at any point in the near future”. However, the Europeans – in alliance with the
US and Israel – tried to block the Palestinian initiative rather than using the
opportunity to turn it into a constructive step towards conflict settlement. In
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this, they have also signalled to the Palestinians that all peaceful and legal pos-
sibilities to achieve Palestinian rights under international law are blocked.
Today, the situation must be described as paradoxical: the contours of an Israeli-
Palestinian settlement are well known, and have been sketched out in the
December 2000 Clinton Parameters, the results of the January 2001 Taba Sum-
mit and the unofficial Geneva Accord of autumn 2003. Also, a two-state solu-
tion has become the internationally accepted paradigm for the settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has been supported by majorities in both popu-
lations. Still, the prospects for its realization are fast disappearing. The increas-
ing fragmentation of the West Bank and the isolation of East Jerusalem neigh-
bourhoods from their surroundings due to continued (or rather, reinforced) con-
struction of settlements, settler roads, checkpoints and the separation barrier as
well as the political and territorial separation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip make a two-state solution increasingly unlikely. At the same time, there is
no alternative that would satisfy the national aspirations of both people and
would be acceptable to neighboring states such as Jordan and Egypt.
The plan presented by the Middle East Quartet (USA, EU, Russia and the UN)
in September 2011 to resume Israeli-Palestinian negotiations puts the onus to
lead on the Europeans. The USA will be in the midst of a (pre-)election campaign
for the time to come and the US administration thus even less in a position to
act as the “honest broker” that is needed to conclude negotiations by the end of
2012. While only a comprehensive regional settlement will be sustainable, for
now mediation should, obviously, focus on the Israeli-Palestinian track. Here,
active and consistent mediation is required – mediation that evens out, rather
than exacerbates the asymmetric relationship between the two parties. In addi-
tion, rather than renegotiating basic principles of a settlement, Europeans
should insist on the parameters that they presented in February 2011 in the
Security Council: a territorial arrangement on the basis of the 1967 borders with
an agreed exchange of territory; security arrangements that meet the needs of
both sides; a just and agreed solution for the refugees; Jerusalem as the capital
of both states. They should also draw up a binding time table, establish an over-
sight mechanism and spell out the consequences of the (probable) failure of a
negotiated solution. Unless the E3 agree on a common approach on these issues
and take the initiative, there is little hope, though, to move forward and resolve
the conflict. Violent escalation is looming – and with it the demise of the two-
state solution.
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